A CORRECT COPY OF SOME NOTES

Concerning

Gods Decrees,

Especially

Of *REPROBATION.*

Written for the *private Vse* of a *Friend* in *Northampton-Shire.* And afterwards *published* to *prevent Calumny.*

1654.

By *T. PIERCE* Rector of *Brington.*

Ἐυλαβοῦ τὰς διαβολὰς κἂν ψευδεῖς ὦσιν. *Isocrat.*

OXFORD.

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To a *Perſon* of *Honour* and *Integrity*, who was the *principal perſwader* to this *Publication*.

THough *I could not well anſwer your* former Reaſons *why I ſhould publiſh a* true Copy *to* anticipate *a* falſe *one, yet I was willing to be* obſtinate *in a caſe of* this nature; *wherein to* vindicate *my* credit, *did ſeem* (*to me*) *too great a* prejudice *to my* eaſe; *and was thought* (*by ſome friends*) *to be an* hazarding *of my* ſafety. *And as I have never been delightled to lye* basking *in the* Sun, *ſo of late* (*more eſpecially*) *I have been even ſo* Amorous *of living* retiredly *in the* ſhade, *that I would fain have provided for my* Peace *and* Quiet, *as more conſiderable to Me, than my* Reputation. *Not that I dare be ſo* wedded *to* eaſe, *or* ſafety, *as* guiltily *to* court *them by* ſloth, *or* cowardize; *nor that* I *dare be ſo* indifferent *to the* good opinion *of* good men, *as not to* deſire *to be very* well thought of; *but becauſe* I *had reſolv'd to* ſit *and* ſmile *upon my* ſufferings, *and to purchaſe* the continuance *of my* beloved obſcurity *and* repoſe, *by that which I thought a* lawful means; *even the* burying *my ſelf amongſt my* books, *and living under the* protection *of* paſſive ſilence. *But having put my* Judgement *into other mens* hands, *and more eſpecially into* yours, *and being perfectly* conquer'd *by your* this week's *letter, who was but* diſorder'd *by your* laſt, (*againſt which I muſt confeſſe I did rather* ſtand out, *by an affected* deafneſſe, *than any real diſſent,*) *and being now no longer threatned by* bare report, *but by* one *who profeſſeth* (*under* hand *and* Seal) *to have been writing againſt* papers *which he reſolvedly calls* mine,

(*adding, that he intends to make them* publick,) *I finde my self brought to such an unfortunate* Dilemma, (*either of having a* false copy *printed, or else of printing a* true copy *to discountenance the* false,) *that I* must *pitch upon this* last *as the* lesser evil. *And so your* wishes *and my* fears *are come upon me; whilst I lie under a* necessity *of* going abroad *into the* world, *meerly in order to my very* privacy *and* peace. *For the very same* Letter *which threatens the* publishing *of* papers falsly *bearing my* Name, *cal's me the* Grandchild *of* Pelagius, the Enemy of God, of Christ, *and* of his Church, *with more such* αἰχρολογία, *than I will ever repay in kinde. The greatest revenge that I will seek, shall be* (*in* love *to his* person) *to* conceal *his* Name. *I hope my* Soul *hath been* dieted with cleaner food, *than to* break out *at the* mouth *into such* exulterate Eryſipelas's. *And that I shall* get moderation *by those very* means, *by which I finde some men have* lost *it. And though I hope it doth not lie in the power of any, to* infect *my* Name *with such a* Leprosie, *as to make it* loathsome *to* those *persons by whom I desire to be* approv'd, *yet have I* hated *the* publication *of this my* scribling, *for fear some* young *or* old Trojan *should make it an* Apple *of* Altercation. *For you know this* Age *is full of* Salamanders, *who never live so pleasantly as in the* Fire *of* Contention: *in hopes to* expire, *and to be buried,* (*like some* Pausanians, *or* Herostratus,) *in the* Armes *of* Fame, *though not of* Glory. *And truly this is the reason, why I have* suffer'd *so* long *in so* deep *a* silence; *even* hating *the* means, *because* abhorring *the* effects, *of a* Vindication; *and desiring that what I* built *upon such* controverted subjects, *might be* (*like* Solomon's Temple) *without the least* noise *of* Axe *or* Hammer. *If I had* lookt *upon* my self

with

with ſo much reverence, *as to have made my ſelf believe I could be* publickly uſeful, *I would have faſten'd upon a* ſubject *which ſhould have been* fitter, *and more* eaſie, *more* profitable, *and* pleaſant, *and every way more* acceptable *to* my ſelf, *and* others. *I have been very attentive to that preaching of* Siracides, Search not the things that are above thy ſtrength, but what is commanded thee think thereupon with reverence, *&c. And whilſt I conſider, that* God will render to every man (*not according to his* opinions, *but*) according to his works; *I do not think it ſo good a task, to make men* orthodox Chriſtians, *as to make them* honeſt *and* ſincere *ones. If I had been one of* thoſe, *who prefer the* Truth *of* opinion *to the* Truth *of* practiſe, *and hate a man more for the* leaſt Error *of his* Judgement, *than for the* greateſt obliquity *of his* Will, *I might indeed have been* forward *on* ſuch *a* Subject. *But becauſe* I *have* ſeriouſly obſerv'd, *that whilſt men* ſcamble *too* eagerly *after the* Truth *of* Religion, *they* (*in the* heat *of* Contention) *do* loſe *the* practiſe, I *have paſſed the* hardeſt cenſure *upon my preſent* neceſſity, *and have been hitherto* (I *believe*) *the* unkindeſt man *in the* world *to mine* own Publication. *But you* (*Sir*) *are to* thank *me for my* misfortune, *in ſubmiſſion to whoſe* Judgement I *have offer'd* violence *to mine* own. *I may be a* ſtranger *to my* ſelf *through the* deceitfulneſſe *of my* Heart, *but if my* Heart *does* not deceive *me, no man living has gon to* Preſſe *with greater* vanity, *than I am now going thether with* ſelf-denial. *I am ſure tis my* averſeneſſe *to this* publication *which has now* extorted *from me an* unproportionable length, *both of my* Letter *to* your ſelf, *and of my* Paræneſis *to the* Reader; *making a* Portal *ſomwhat too* large, *for the* littleneſſe *of the* Cottage *to which it* lead's. *Which as*

Eccleſiaſticus 3, 21, 22, 23.

Rom. 2. 6.

I firſt

I firſt ſubmitted *to your* Judgement, *ſo muſt I now* commit *it to your* diſpoſal, *and withal* commend *it to your* Protection. *I ſay to your* Protection, *becauſe* (*whilſt the* Preſſe *is ſo* proſtituted, *And the* Age *ſo* prurient,) *it is not likely to be the* ſafer, *for being* innocent. *It was not the* modeſty *of* Suſanna, *that was able to* ſecure *her from the* Indictment *of the* Elders; *and 'twas the* innocence *of* Joſeph, *which made his* Miſtreſſe *pronounce him* guilty. *But had I imagined* (*as I did not*) *that my* private Notes *would have been ſo ſoon* vitiated, *and ſo unhappily* expos'd *too, when I deliver'd them as* whiſpers *into* one *man's* Ear, *I would infallibly have us'd them, as* Virginius *did his* vertuous Daughter; *that at leaſt they might have gon* unpolluted out *of the* world. *But ſince they are ſeverely* condemn'd *to* live, *in ſpight of all my endeavours to have* ſuppreſt *them,* (Nam Pro ſupplicio eſt, non potuiſſe mori,) *and that* you will *have them ſhew'd by* me, *in their* natural ſhape, *rather than by any* ſtranger, *in any* uncharitable diſguiſe; *I hope that* you *will ſecure me from* farther trouble, *by undertaking its* vindication *againſt whatſoever* pragmatick perſon, *who ſhall poßibly abuſe either* Them, *or* me. *For the* temptation *muſt be* greater, *and* the neceſſity *more* urgent, *than* I *hope it will ever be, if* I draw *at either* end *of the* Saw *of* ſtrife. *But you have* leiſure, *as well as* skill; *and you are able to* forget *your* rank *and* Quality, *in* favour *to* him *who does honour your* vertues *and* Erudition, *above your* Fortune *and your* Blood. *And who is not more by* obligation *of* Duty, *than by the peculiar inclinations of his Soul, Sir,*

Your affectionate, obliged
And humble Servant,

From my Houſe
at *Brington*,
Jan. 20. 1654.

T. PIERCE.

A *PARÆNESIS* to the *Reader.*

(*Shewing the* first occaſion *of this* following Diſcourſe, *and the* Author's neceſſity to *make it* publick.)

SECT. 1.

THat I am ſubject to *errors*, it is no *humility* to acknowledge; it being no more than to confeſſe, that I carry about me the infirmities of a *man*; which whoſoever doth not, let *him caſt the firſt ſtone at me.* But whether or no I am an *Heretique*, or a *dangerous Perſon*, I deſire my *Cenſors* may be my *Judges*; and do therefore addreſſe this preſent *Apologie* and *Appeal*, not to the *kindneſſe* and *partiality* of my deareſt *friends*, but to the very *jealouſies* and *prejudices* of my ſevereſt *enemies*. I bar the ſuffrage of none, but the *accuſer of the Brethren*, that *Abaddon* or *Apollyon*, ſo *very skilfull to deſtroy*, *who is the Father of Lies*, and was *a murderer from the beginning*.

Joh. 8. 7.

Rev. 12. 10. 9. 11. Joh. 8. 14. 44.

2. I do profeſſe in the preſence of that *punctuall Regiſter* within me, (to which I bear a greater *reverence* than to *affront* it with a premeditated and *wilful Lie*,) that I do not *unſheath* my Pen, to *wound* the *reputation* of any man living. But ſince mine own does lie *bleeding* in the mouths of *ſome*, whoſe very *Tongues* have *Teeth too*, which *bite* much *harder* than I will ever allow *mine*; (and if there happen to be any in all my papers, I ſhall not think it *painful* to have them *drawn*,) it is but needful that I be cloth'd, at leaſt with *armour* of *defence*. I meant indeed, at the firſt, only to have *armed* my ſelf with *ſilence*, that my *reſervedneſſe* and *obſcurity* might keep me *ſafe*: and even now that I am *forc'd*, and as it were *drag'd* into the *field*, I contend not

not for *victory*, but for an *honourable Retreat*. So that if after I have ſuffer'd, I may be *competently ſafe*, I will thank my *Buckler*, but not my *Sword*. Even now that I am *writing*, 'tis with a kinde of *willingneſſe* to *blot* it *out*; and I do only *ſo* do it, as preferring an *Inconvenience*, before a *Miſchief*.

3. There had been a *private conference* betwixt a Gentleman and my ſelf, which (for his further ſatisfaction) I threw haſtily into paper; every whit as *incoherent*, as it had been in our *oral* and *extemporary* Diſcourſe. a Diſcourſe which of neceſſity was forc'd to be without *method*, as without *premeditation*; becauſe (in my *anſwers* to his *objections*) I was bound up to *follow*, after the meaſure that I was *led*. I thought the thing ſo *inconſiderable*, as not to vouchſafe it a *reading over*, but juſt as it was written, deliver'd it inſtantly to my friend, to be return'd (when he had us'd it) unto the *uſual place of my forgetfulneſſe*. And forgotten it was ſo long, that truly I know not how long it was; till diſcourſing with another Gentleman upon the very ſame ſubject, I found my memory awak'd by that *ſleeping ſcribble*; And (forgetting that *ſecrets* do ceaſe to be ſo, when they are *told* though but to *one*, and that with ſtrict conjurations of greateſt *ſecrecy*, gave him leave to peruſe it as his leiſure ſerv'd him. It ſeems this Gentleman had a *Confident*, as well as I; and ſo my *original* grew to multiplie into many falſe copies, of which *not one* was like the *Mother*. Now that my paper went abroad by the help of more *hands* than one, was againſt my *knowledge*, againſt my *will*, againſt my *precept*, againſt my *care*, and laſtly againſt my *beſt endeavours* to *recal them*. It having been abſolutely impoſſible, that I ſhould love the *publication* of my *contemptible Abortive*, who never eſteemed even my *ripeſt* and moſt *legitimate productions* to be any way worthy of *publique view*. So far was I from an *ambition* of being known by a *disfigur'd*, *miſshapen child*, that when I heard of its *travels*, it was ſain out of my *memory*; and when it came to me in a *diſguiſe*, it was quite out of my *knowledge*.

4. I do acknowledge the great *abſtruſneſſe* of the whole ſub-ject

ſubject on which I treated, and the *diſproportion* of my faculties to undertake or manage it as it deſerves. For if the learned Biſhop *Andrewes* did chooſe with S. *Auſtin*, much more may I with Biſhop *Andrewes*, rather to *hear* then to *ſpeak* of theſe *Inſearchables*. I do not hope to fathom, either the *Bathos* of the *Apoſtle*, or the *Pſalmiſt*'s *Abyſſe*. But I expect to be pardon'd, if when my way is ſlippery, I take heed to my *footing*; and if I ſo eſchew the *precipice*, as not to run upon the *Wolfe*. It is not the buſineſſe of theſe *papers*, either to ſtate an *old queſtion* in a *new found way*, or to publiſh my *judgment* as a *conſiderable thing*. *Who* am I, that I ſhould *moderate* between the *Remonſtrants* and *Antiremoſtrants*? betwixt S. *Auſtin* and *other Fathers*? betwixt *him* and *himſelf*? betwixt the *Synod* of *Dort*, and that other at *Auguſta*? betwixt the *Dominicans* and the *Jeſuites*? *Arminius* and Mr. *Perkins*? *Twiſſe* and *Bellarmine*? or betwixt *Whitaker* and *Baro*? Much indeed may be *excus'd*, becauſe much may be *look't* for, from ſuch reverend Prelates, as were *Overall*, and *Davenant*. But I beleeve, amongſt the *Clergy*, there is not *one* in an *hundred* fit to *ſpeak* of theſe *Myſteries*; and amongſt the *Laity*, not *one* in a *thouſand* that's fit to *hear* them. Hence was that *ſilence* at the firſt, and afterwards that *ſecrecie*, wherein I fain would have *buried* my private reaſonings. and even now that I am *forc'd* to be more publique then I *meant*, (by the many *falſe copies* of my *diſcourſe*, whereof *one* of the *falſeſt* is now preparing for the *preſſe*, by one who (it ſeems) is at very *great leiſure*,) it is not at all from any *ambition* to be *follow'd*, but from an humble *deſire* of being *rightly underſtood*; and I do therefore only pretend to an *Apologie*, and an *Appeal*. Firſt, an *Apologie*, for my *Imprudence*; that I could think ſuch a ſecret might be communicated to *one*; and ſo betray thoſe *papers* to the *Light*, which belonged only to the *Fire*. Secondly, an *Appeal*, whether I am a flat *Pelagian*, or whether ſo much as a *Maſſilian*: or whether indeed I am not rather a very *Orthodox* ſon of the *Church* of *England*. I have *managed* my *diſcourſe*, as I *ground* my *Faith*, not from that which is

Epiſc. Winton' in Jud. de art.

Rom. 11 33.
Pſal. 36. 6.

hidd of God's *secret will*, but from that which is *expreſs't* of his *written Word*. Where, of *divers* interpretations, (as often as they are *divers*,) I love to pitch upon *That*, which I finde agreed upon by the beſt and *wiſeſt*. And which, in my *ſhallow judgement*, (which yet is the *deepeſt* that I *have*,) doth ſeem the *ſafeſt*, and the moſt *ſutable* to the *Analogie of Faith*. Even *Babes* and *Idiots* have this advantage of their *betters*, to be *afaid* of that *fire* where *wiſer* men have been *burnt*. And *ſad experience* hath *taught me*, (who am a *Babe* and an *Idiot* in reſpect of the *aged* and the *wiſe*,) to *ſteer aloof* in my *Doctrines* from thoſe fatal *ſhelves* whereon mine own *ſmall veſſel* hath oft been *daſhed*, and many others (much *greater*) as it were *ſhipwrackt* before mine *eyes*. This intirely is the reaſon, why I have *hover'd* a long time betwixt the *Abſoluteneſſe* of a *Decree*, and the *Liberty* of a *Will*; like a *trembling Needle* betwixt *two Loadſtones*; or rather like a man *newly walking* upon a *Rope*, who ſo *ballanceth* his body with his two *hands*, that his *continual fear* of *falling* is the principal *Tenure* by which he *ſtands*. I dare not, for my life, be ſo *bold* as the *Pelagians*, nor yet ſo bloudy as the *Manichees*. I would not be *ſplit* on the *Symplegades* of *two* intolerable *miſchiefs*, by robbing God of his *Efficiency* in any *one* Act which is *naturally* good; or by *aſperſing* his *holineſſe* in any *one Act* which is *morally evill*. I do endeavour to keep my ſelf, (and others committed to my *keeping*,) both from the *rock* of *Preſumption*, and from the *gulf* of *Deſpair*. I *ſteer* as carefully as I can (in this ſo dangerous *Archipelago*) betwixt the *nature* of *Gods will*, and the *condition* of mine *own*; that ſo my *Confidence* may conſiſt with the great Requiſite of *Humility*. I dare not *impute* to *God* what is *unworthy* for him to *own*; nor *arrogate* to my *ſelf* what is *God's peculiar*: and therefore ſettle my *minde* and *judgement* upon theſe *two Grounds*.

The two Principles *or* Grounds *of my* Belief *in this* buſineſſe.

I. That all the *Evil of ſin* which *dwelleth in me*, or *cometh from me*, is not imputable unto *God's will*, but intirely to *mine own*. The *Serpent* and the *Protoplaſt* were *promoters* of my guilt, but *my God* was no promoter either

either of *their* guilt or *mine*. *When the Serpent ſpeaketh a lie, he ſpeaketh of his own; He is the Father of lies, and the works of your father ye will do*, Joh. 8. 44.

II. That *all the good* which I *do*, I do firſt *receive*; not from *any* thing in my *ſelf*, but from the *ſpecial Grace* and *favour* of Almighty God, who *freely* worketh in me, both to *will* and to *do* of his *good pleaſure*. Phil. 2. 13.

CHAP. I.

5. IF theſe are *Principles* to be *granted*, my work is don; for theſe are the *Grounds* on which I *build* my Theologie, and theſe are the *Touchſtones* by which I *try* it. Whatſoever I beleeve concerning *Election* or *Reprobation*, and whatſoever other *Queſtions* which are depending, I do infer from theſe *Truths*, which cannot poſſibly *deceive* me. And whilſt I ſtand to theſe *Grounds*, I am not able to *quit* my *judgement*, how little ſoever it ſhall be *favour'd* by ſuch as are *wittily unreaſonable*. So that my *Principles* be *right*, I care not *whither* they *conduct me*, whilſt *Scripture* and my *beſt Care* are both my *Guides* in the *conveyance*; for where the *Premiſes* are *true*, the *Concluſion* cannot be *falſe*. All that needs to be car'd for in the *progreſſe* of my *ſearch*, is the *legality* of the *deduction*; which, if it be *wrong*, I ſhall be very glad to hear of for my *inſtruction*; and if it be *right*, it cannot chooſe but be *Truth*, which leaps ſo *naturally* forth from the *womb of truth*.

Sic proponam, ſic aſſeram, ut veritati, quæ nec fallit, nec fallitur, ſemper inhæream, ſemper obediens conſentiens-q; reperiar. Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1. ſub init.

6. If by any inadvertency (either in *me*, or in the *reader*,)

der,) my *words* ſeem to *claſh* with my *Belief*, it is by no other misfortune then befell the Great *S. Auſtin*, when he us'd ſuch expreſſions againſt the *Pelagians*, as ſeem'd at leaſt to contradict what he had ſpoken againſt the *Manichees*; and yet (as he profeſſeth) it was not his *judgement*, but his *ſtyle* only that was chang'd. The ſaying of *Bucer* is remarkable, (and the more for being *Bucer's*,) That *there was not any ſuch harm in what was ſaid by the learned, both ancient and modern, concerning the freedom of the Will, if things were taken as they were meant*, (that is to ſay) by the *right handle*. And that would oftner be don, if the *perſons* of ſome men were not a *prejudice* to their *cauſe*. For I finde the *ſame words* may paſſe with *favour* from *one*, which would not be *endur'd*, ſhould they be ſpoken by *another*. One *ſhort example* will not be *burdenſom* to the *Reader*. Doctor *Twiſſe* himſelf hath ſaid, *That the juſtice of God doth not appear in the abſolute or ſimple condemnation of his creature, but in the condemnation of it for ſin.* Thus he ſpeaketh in his *Preface*, which is moſt of it ſpent againſt *Arminius*. I did but ſay the *ſame words* to ſome *admirers* of Dr. *Twiſſe*, and yet was counted an *Arminian*; which makes me heartily deſire, that I may meet with *unbyas't impartial Readers*; that whatſoever I ſhall ſay in theſe following papers, may be *compar'd* with the two *Principles* I have even now *laid*: I diſallowing *all*, that *diſagrees* with thoſe *principles*, as the *unhappineſſe* of my *pen*, or the *unſteedineſſe* of my *brain*. I deſire all may *go* for *no more* then it is *worth*. If I ſeem to any man *overtaken in a fault*, he ſhall do well to *reſtore me in the ſpirit of meekneſſe, remembring himſelf leſt he alſo be tempted*. If I am thought to be in the *wrong*, by thoſe that think themſelves only in the *right*, they can conclude no worſe of me, then that *I am not infallible*.

Nec ineſt iis quæ de libero arbitrio Patres quidem & Neoterici aſſeruerunt, ea quam olim non nulli putant impietas, ſi hæc rite modò accipiantur, & ſicut ipſi ſcriptores ea accipi voluerunt.

Apud Caſſand. conſul. p. 130.

In præfat. ad Vind. Grat. p. 3.

Gal. 6. 1.

fallible. If in any thing I *erre*, it is for *want* of *apprehension*, and not of *willingness* to *apprehend*; nor am I *severely* to be censur'd, for being every whit as *dull*, as those *thousands of thousands* who have thought as I do. I hope my *Reasons* will make it clear, that if I erre, I am not *affectedly*, but *invincibly* ignorant; and so for being most *unpassionately*, I am most *pardonably erroneous*. Or if I am thought not to be so, I desire one favour from them that so think, even that all my faults (whether *real*, or *suppos'd*,) may rather be laid upon my *person*, then imputed to my *Cause*.

7. Before I come to prove any thing from the *first* of my *Principles*, I foresee a *necessity* to *prove* my *Principles* to be *true*; for *though the foolishnesse of man perverteth his way, yet his heart fretteth against the Lord*. There are men in the world of no *small name*, who have told the world both out of the *Pulpit*, and from the *Presse*, that *all the evill of sin* which is *in man* proceedeth from *God* only as the *Author*, and from *Man* only as the *Instrument*; whether or no I am deceiv'd, let the *Reader* judge by the following *Catalogue* of *Expressions*. I forbear to name the *Authors*, in meer *civility* to their *persons*: but I have them lying by me very particularly *quoted*, and will produce them, if I am challenged by any man's *Doubt*, or *Curiosity*. The Expressions are such as these: (to begin with the mildest.) Prov. 19. 3.

"That *all things* happen, not only by God's *Praescience*, but by his expresse *order* and positive *Decree*. L. 3. c. 23. 6. p. 324.
"Whereby many from the *womb* are *elected* to certain
"and *inevitable Destruction*, that by their misery God's
"Name may be glorified.

"That God directeth his *voice* to some, but that they L. 3. c. 24. 9. 13 p. 223.
"may

"may be ſo much the *deafer*; he gives *light* unto them, "but that they may be ſo much the *blinder*; he offers "them *inſtruction*, but that they may be the more *igno-* "*rant*; and he uſeth a *remedy*, but to the end they may "*not* be *healed*.

L. 1. *c.* 18. §. 4. *p.* 71.

"That a wicked man, by the *juſt impulſe* of *God* doth "that which *is not lawful for him to do*.

L. 1. *c.* 17. §. 11. *p.* 66.

"That the Devil and wicked men are ſo *reſtrained* "on every ſide with the *hand* of *God*, as with a *bridle*, "that they cannot *conceive*, nor *execute* any *miſchief*, nor "ſo much as *endeavour* its execution, any farther then "God himſelf doth (not *permit* only, but) *command*: "nor are they only held in *fetters*, but *compelled* alſo as "with a *bridle*, to perform obedience to ſuch commands.

L. 1. *c.* 17. §. 5. *p.* 64.

"That *Theeves* and *Murderers* are the *inſtruments* of "the *Divine Providence*, which the Lord himſelf uſeth "to execute his Judgements which he hath determined "within himſelf, and that *he works through them*.

L. 1. *part.* 1. *Digr.* 10. *c.* 1. §. 4. *p.* 125.

"That *Gods Decree*, by which any man is deſtined to "condemnation for ſin, is not an *Act of his Juſtice*, nor "doth it *preſuppoſe ſin*. Or if *Damnation* doth *preſuppoſe* "*ſin*, it doth not follow, that the *Præſcience of ſin* doth "precede the *Will* or *Decree* of *Damning*; or if the "Will of Damning any man is an *act of vindicative Ju-* "*ſtice*, it doth not follow that it *præſuppoſeth ſin*.

Ibid. §. 12. *p.* 140.

"That God can will that man ſhall *not fall*, by his *will* "which is called *Voluntas ſigni*, and in the mean while "he

" he can ordain that the ſame man ſhall *infallibly* and *ef-*
" *ficaciouſly fall*, by his *Will*, which is called *Voluntas bene*
" *placiti*. The former *will* of God is improperly called
" his *will*, for it only ſignifieth what man *ought* to do by
" *right*; but the latter *will* is properly called a *Will*, be-
" cauſe by that he decreed what ſhould [inevitably]
" come to paſſe.

" That when God *makes* an *Angel* or a *Man* a *Tranſ-*
" *greſſor*, he himſelf doth not tranſgreſſe, becauſe he
" doth not break a law. The *very ſame ſin*, viz. *Adultery*
" or *Murder*, in as much as it is the work of *God* the
" *Author*, *mover*, and *compeller*, it is *not* a *crime*; but in
" as much as it is of *man*, it is a *wickedneſſe*.

In ſerm. de Prov. c. 5. & c. 6. & ſic citatur l. 2. part. 1. p. 36.

" That they are cowards and ſeek for *ſubterfuges*, who
" ſay that this is done by God's *Permiſſion* only, and not
" by his *Will*. If the *excæcation and madneſſe* of *Ahab*
" is a Judgement of God, the *fiction* of *bare permiſſion*
" doth preſently *vaniſh*; becauſe it is ridiculous, that
" the Judge ſhould *only permit*, and not alſo *decree* what
" he will have done, and alſo command the execution
" of it to his Miniſters.

L. 1. c. 18. §. 1. p. 68.

" That God's decree is not leſſe *efficacious* in the per-
" miſſion of *Evill*, then in the production of *Good*. (Nay)
" that God's will doth paſſe, not only into the *Permiſſion*
" of the ſin, but into the *ſin it ſelf* which is *permitted*.
" (Nay) that the *Dominicans* do *imperfectly* and *ob-*
" *ſcurely* relate the Truth, whileſt beſides Gods concur-
" rence to the making way for ſin, they require nothing
" but the *negation of efficacious Grace*, when it is mani-

L. 2. part. 1. p. 142, 143, 147, 148, &c.

"feſt, that there is a *farther proſtitution to ſins required.* "(Nay afterwards) that God doth *adminiſter* the occa- "ſions of ſinning, and doth ſo *move* and *urge* them, that "they *ſmite the ſinners minde*, and *really affect his Imagi-* "*nation*, according to all thoſe degrees, whether of *Pro-* "*fit* or *Pleaſure*, repreſented in them.

If my *hand* were not *weary*, if my *heart* did not *tremble*, if both my *ears* did not *tingle*, I could reckon up many more ſuch *frightfull ſayings*, from mine own *knowledge* and *inſpection*, which I have quoted to the *page*, and can do to the *line* of their ſeveral *Authors*: beſides a *cloud* of blaſphemies which I could name from other *compilers*, if I either *liſted* or had *need* to take up any upon *Truſt*. Now by all this it appears, (as well as by many *too literal expoſitions* of ſome Texts in Scripture, which make God (bleſſed for ever!) to be the *Tempter*, the *Deceiver*, and *the Father of Lies*,) there is a *neceſſity* lying upon me to *prove* my *firſt Principle*, before *ſome Readers* will dare to *truſt* it, *viz.*

The firſt Principle.

That all the Evill of ſin which dwelleth *in me*, is not imputable to *God's* Will, but entirely to mine *own*. *Adam* and the *Serpent* may be allowed as *ſharers*, but my *God* (bleſſed for ever!) is none at all.

Proved by Scripture.

8. This is plain by *Scripture*, & by the Evidences of *Reaſon*: (to which anon I ſhall add *Antiquity*.) And firſt for *Scripture*, though the force of a *Negative Argument* is not *irrefragable*, yet it is not unworthy to be obſerv'd, that God is no where affirm'd to *Predeſtine ſin*: and therefore the word *Predeſtination* is us'd without any *Epithet*, to ſignifie

Prædeſtinare Deum homines ad peccata, aut pœnas, in S. Scripturis non dicitur, ſed eos ad vitam æternam prædeſtinare dicitur, quos vocare decernit. Grot. in Riv. Ap. Diſc. p. 52.

ſignifie nothing but *Election* in the ordinary ſenſe: & it is ſet by *Divines* (both ancient and modern) as an oppoſite member to *Reprobation*; which cannot be done from the *bare nature* of the *word*, but from the *Vſe* of it in *Scripture*: and why ſhould that be the *ſole uſe* of it (when the word it ſelf is as *fit* to ſignifie the *contrary*) but becauſe God is the Author of all the *good* that we *do*, and of all the good that we *receive*, whereas Man is his own Author of *all* the *Evil* which he *committeth*, and of the *Evil* which he *ſuffereth* for ſuch *commiſſions*?

Quatuor priores Articuli Lambethani ſunt de Prædeſtinatione, *&* Reprobatione, *quarum illa ſignificatur* Rom. 11. 33. *has* Pſal. 36. 6. Epiſc. Wint. de Artic. Judic.

9. And though this bare *negative Proof* might ſeem ſufficient in ſuch a caſe, [that *God doth no where profeſſe he wil's or decrees the ſin of Man*] yet (to make us *inexcuſable* when we excuſe our ſelves, like *Adam*, by any the leaſt accuſation of him that made us) God doth every where profeſſe, that *he wil's not*: as when he (a) *forbids* it by his *Lawes*, when he *provides* againſt it by his (b) *Diſcipline*, when he (c) *ſhews* us how to *avoid* it, when he *tels* us he cannot (d) *endure* it, when he (e) *wins* us from it by *Promiſes*, when he *frights* us from it by (f) *Threats*, when he profeſſeth that it is to him both a (g) *Trouble*, and a *Diſhonour*. How doth he (h) *wiſh* that his *People had walked in his wayes*? How doth he (i) *expoſtulate* and make his *Appeal*, whether he had *omitted any thing*, which might tend to the *converſion* of a *ſinful Iſrael*? in the whole (k) 18. chapter of *Ezekiel*, God is pleaſed to make his own *Apologie* and *Appeal*, even to them that had accus'd him in an *unworthy Proverb*: [The Fathers have eaten ſowre Grapes, and the childrens Teeth are ſet on edge] *Are not my waies equal*?

a Exod. 20. 1. Rom. 6. 12.
b 1 Tim. 1. 20.
c Deut. 11. 18. 26.
d Pſ. 5. 4 5. & 45. 7.
e Iſ. 61. 8. Deut. 5. 29.
f Ro. 1. 18. Gen. 2. 17.
g Iſ. 7. 13.
h Pſal 81. 13.
i Iſa. 5 3. 4.
k Verſ. 2, 29.

and *are not your waies unæqual?* Sure *their* waies had been *his*, if he had *abſolutely contriv'd them. The ſoul that ſinneth it ſhall die*, verſ. 4. *And why will ye die O houſe of Iſrael?* verſ. 31. Which was virtually to aske them, *why they would ſin too*; which they *ought* to have done, if he had *will'd* it: for the poſitive *will* of God *muſt* and *ought* to be *done*; and *can* any man be *puniſht* for doing that which he *muſt*? *Muſt* any man be *puniſht* for doing that which he *ought*? 'Tis but an ill κρυσφύγετον (which ſome men uſe) to ſay that God hath a *double Will*, of which the one is *ſecret*, and the other *revealed*; the revealed will not only *diverſe*, but even *oppoſite* to the *ſecret* one: God *ordaining* ſin with the *one*, whileſt he *forbids* it with the *other*; and not alwaies *willing in ſecret* what he *reveals* himſelf to *be willing to*, for this is a *Salvo* (*a* σοφὸν φάρμακον) a great deal worſe then the *wound* which it fain would *cure*. Gods *will* indeed is divided amongſt *orthodox Divines* in reſpect of *ſeverall Acts*, and in *relation* to *ſeveral objects*, or to the very ſame object at *ſeveral Times*, and in *ſeveral Qualifications*, into his *firſt will*, and his *ſecond will*, his *antecedent* and *conſequent*, his *ſecret* and *revealed* will: but to affirm *two wils* in *ſimplicity it ſelf*, the one *contrariant* to the other about the very *ſame Act*, (the one *decreeing* that *very act* which is *prohibited* by the other) ſeemeth a greater blaſphemy to *me*, then that which the *Gnoſticks*, and the *Marcionites*, and the *Manichees* were guilty of, when they affirmed *two Gods*, as the different Fountains of *Good* and *Evil*. For by what I finde in *Tertullian* (who was beſt acquainted with *Marcion*'s Hereſies) thoſe *two Principles* of *Good* and *Evil* were found out as a *Refuge* for thoſe *other opinions*, againſt which it is, that this my *Scribble*

Θέλημα πρῶτον, τὸ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι ἡμαρτηκότας. Θέλημα δεύτερον, τὸ γενομένους κακοὺς ἀπολέσθαι. *Chryſoſt. in c. 1. ad Eph. Homil. 1. p. 1036.*

Auguſtin. Hæreſ. 6. Tertull. adverſus Mar. l. 1. c. 1. Duos Deos adfert tanquam duas Symplegadas naufragii ſui.

Scribble was firſt deſign'd. And what *Tertullian* ſpeaks againſt *Marcion*, might very well be repeated againſt the *Abſolute Reprobatarians*: it having been better and more reaſonable (in that *Father's Judgement*) that God ſhould *never* have *forbid* what he *determin'd* ſhould be *done*, then that he ſhould *determine* to be *done* what he *forbid*. And ſo 'tis the *leſſer blaſphemy* of the two, to aſcribe *Holineſſe* to one principle, and *Vnholineſſe* to another, (in the *Marcionite's* ſenſe,) then *both* to him who is the *Spirit of Holineſſe*; who therefore cannot ſo *irreſpectively* decree the *puniſhment* of his *Creature*, as to *neceſſitate* his *ſin*, and ſo be the *Author* of his *Impenitence*.

Quis iſte Deus tam bonus, ut ab illo malus fiat? ibid. c. 23.

Ibid. c. 26.

10. *Let no man ſay then when he is tempted, I am tempted of God* (as our modern *Ranters* are wont to do) *for every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own luſt and enticed.* So far is God from being the Author of any man's ſin, that *he is faithfull* (ſaith the Apoſtle) *and will not ſuffer us to be tempted above what we are able*, but *will be* ſure to *make a way* either for *conqueſt*, or for *eſcape*. I dare not ſay then (with *him* in the *Comedian*, who had been a *great ſinner*,) *Quid ſi hæc quiſpiam voluit Deus? What if ſome God hath ſo decree'd it?* for *S. James* makes me beleeve, that ſin is both *ingendred* and *conceived* within me: when my *luſt* hath *conceived*, it *bringeth forth ſin*: and if my *Luſt* is the *Mother*, ſure the *Father* is my *Will*. It was *David's* ſaying of wicked *Iſrael*, *that they provok'd God to anger* (not with *his will*, but) *with their own Inventions*: there are *Contrivers of miſchief*, (Pſ. 58. 2.) *Deviſers of lies*, (Eccleſ. 7. 13.) ſuch *as weary themſelves to commit iniquity* (Jer. 9. 5.) Which cannot poſſibly be imputed unto an *abſolute decree*. How many *Volumes* have been written

Jam. 1. 13. 14. 15.

1 Cor. 10. 13.

Terent, in Eunuch.

Jam. 1. 15.

Pſ. 106. 29.

Vide Cornel. Agrip. de vanit. scient.

De arte Magica? De arte Meretricia? De arte Lenonum? with such others as would *blush* to be nam'd in *English*; & dare we say they are *decreed*, to be *Mysteriously wicked?* or that their *destruction* was *irrespective* & *unconditionall?* I am in such *disorder* and *discomposednesse* of mind, whilst I only *repeat* these *bold expressions*, that were it not to *good* purpose (as I conjecture and intend) I *durst* not *venture* to *repeat* them. *O Lord, righteousnesse belongeth unto thee,* Dan. 9. 7. *but unto us confusion of face.* For *thou hast made man* Eccles. 7. 29. *upright, but we have found out many inventions.*

Proved secondly by Reasons.

11. After *Scripture* I come to *Reason*; by which I hope to make it appear, that God Almighty is so far from being *Accessary* to sin, and does so many things to *hinder* it, that he doth not *permit* it but in an *equitable sense:* and amongst many reasons which may be given, I shall (in *civility* to my *reader*, and for the *love* of *brevity*,) content my self with *that one*, which to my seeming is the *best*; and I the rather think it the *best*, because I ground it upon a notion which I have formerly learnt from *most judicious Mr. Hooker*: That which *assigns* to every thing the *kind*, that which *moderates* the *power*, and *appoints* the *form* and *measure* of working, That we properly call a *Law*. Hence the *being* of God is a kind of *Law* to his *working*; because that *perfection* which God *is*, giveth *perfection* to that he *doth*. So that *being* nothing but what is *good*, he can *work* nothing that is *otherwise*. It is therefore an *errour* (saith that *Man of judgement*) to think there is no *Reason* for the works of God, besides his *absolute will*, (although no reason is known to *us*,) for the Apostle tels us, *he worketh all things* (not *simply* and *meerly* according to his *will*, but) κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, *according to the Counsel of his will:* and because

Hooker Eccl. Polit. l. 1.

Eph. 1. 11.

cauſe he doth *voluntarily* ſet himſelf a *Law* whereby to work, it followes that that *Law* is no abatement to his *freedom*. If he is pleas'd to ſet himſelf a *Law* or *Rule*, not to reprobate any but upon *præſcience* of *ſin*, (becauſe that is moſt conformable to the *nature* of his *goodneſſe*,) can this be any prejudice to the *perfection* of his *being*? Is his *nature* the leſſe *abſolute*, becauſe it pleaſes him that his *will* be *conditionall* in *ſome* things, as it is *abſolute* in *others*? Does he *loſe* any *prærogative*, by being *unable* to be the *Author of ſin*? Or is not that rather a very great *Argument* of his *Power*? ſuch an *ability* as That being meer *Infirmity*. *We* are *God's* Creatures, but *ſin* is ours. *God ſaw every thing that he had made and behold it was very good.* We ſee the things that are made by the *Fiat* of our *will*, and behold they are very *evil*. This *Creative power* of *ours* we juſtly reckon as the ſequel of *Humane weakneſſe*, and ſhall we heedleſly affirm it to be a *Jewel* in the glorious *diadem* of *God's Almightineſſe*? The Apoſtle indeed hath told us, *that God worketh all things*, (Eph. 1. 11.) but firſt he ſpeaks it of God's *Election* which he *prædeſtin'd* in his *Son*, and the means conducing to ſuch *an end*, which are none but *good*; not at all of *Reprobation*, the *means* in order to which are none but *evill*. Secondly, even * *Beza* himſelf doth ſo interpret that place, as not to *annihilate*, or *ſtupefie*, but rather to ſtrengthen, and to *rectifie* our *wils*. God makes an *ill will* a *good one*, not *no will* at all; (as * *Beza* elſewhere ſpeaks, and it were heartily to be wiſht that he had never ſpoken otherwiſe) according to that of *Auſtin*, *Ex nolentibus facit volentes*. He ſaies *facit*, not *adigit*, *cogit*, *compellit*. He *makes* us willing *who were unwilling*, but does not *force* us to be willing *whilſt we are* unwilling;

Gen. 1. 31.

* *Nec tamen idcirco ſumus ſtipites; ea enim nobis ut velimus & poſſimus concedit.* Beza in Eph. 1. 11.

* *Bene volumus, non quidem naturâ, ſed quia Deus ex malâ voluntate bonam fecit.* Ad Philip. 2. 13.

ling; (that is to ſay, to be *willing againſt* our *wils*, or *whether we will or no.*)

12. But I finde that I have *ſhot* ſomewhat farther then I *aim*'d; it being only my deſign, and the proper buſineſſe of this place, to ſhew, that the words of the Apoſtle, [*he worketh all things*] are infinitely far from being meant either of *ſin*, or *Reprobation*. So far from that, that God Almighty does not *permit* ſin, as *permiſſion* ſignifies *connivence* or *conſent*; but he *permits* it, as that ſignifies [*not hinder by main force.*] If I ſee a man ſtealing and ſay nothing to him, I ſo *permit* as to be *guilty*: but if I *warn* and *exhort*, if I *promiſe* and *threaten*, and do all that may avert him (beſides *killing* him) I ſo *permit* as to be *innocent*. In like manner, all that is done by God Almighty by way of *permiſſion*, is his ſuffering us to *live*, and have that *nature* of the *will* with which he *made* us. Whereas *to deſtroy us* for the prevention of ſin, or to make us become *ſtocks* (as *Beza* phrases it) or like *wooden Engines*, (which are moved only by *wires* at the *meer pleaſure* and diſcretion of the *Engineer*) were by inevitable conſequence to * *uncreate* his *Creature*, which to do were repugnant to his immutability, as *Tertul.* ſhewes. This is all that I am able to *apprehend*, or *pronounce*, [that God *permits* our *ſins* in *this ſenſe only*; and that he *diſpoſes* and *orders* them to the *beſt advantage.*]

13. Having proved my *firſt Principle* by *Scripture* and *Reaſon*, it will be as eaſie to confirm it by the *common ſuffrage* of *Antiquity*; and to avoid the Repetition of ſo long a Catalogue, which I ſuppoſe will be as *needleſſe*, as I am ſure it will be *nauſeous* to a *conſiderable Reader*, I refer him to the Citations which will follow

* *Liberum & ſui arbitrii & ſuæ poteſtatis invenio hominem à Deo inſtitutum; nullam magis Imaginem & ſimilitudinem Dei in illo animadvertens; quàm ejuſmodi ſtatûs formam.* Tertull. adverſ. Marc. l. 2. c. 5. ſee alſo cap. 6. 7.

Proved by Antiquity c. 2. §. 18.

follow my *first inference Sect.* 18. And content my self at present to shut up all with that *Article* of the *Augustan Confession*; (to which our 39 *Articles* have the greatest *regard* and *conformity*, and which for that very reason is to me the most venerable of any *Protestant Confession* except *our own*,) That *though God is the Creator and Preserver of Nature, yet the only cause of sin is the will of the wicked* (*that is to say, of the Devil, & ungodly men,*) *turning it self from God to other things against the* (*will and*) *commandments of God.* And the *Orange Synod* doth pronounce an *Anathema* upon all that think otherwise.

Tametsi Deus creat & conservat Naturam, tamen causa peccati est voluntas malorum viz. Diaboli & impiorum hominum qua avertit se à Deo ad alias res, contra mandata Dei. August. Confess. Artic. 16.

Aliquos ad malum divinâ potestate præordinatos esse, non solùm non credimus, sed etiam si sint qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione in illis Anathema dicimus. Synod. Arausic. Can. 25.

If any will not subscribe to this *Confession*, I will leave him to learn *modesty* both from *Arrian* the *Heathen*, and from *Philo* the *Jew*.

Ἐκείσεσαι ὡσ' ἅλλε μῦ ἀδινὸς, ὡσὸ σ' αὐτῦ Ν. *Arrian. in Epictet.*
Εἰμαρμένῃ τε ἢ ἀνάγκῃ θεοσλαζήσαντες, ἀσεβείας πολλῆς κατέπλησαν τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. *Philo* περὶ ἀφθαρσίας τῦ κόσμε. p. 325.

CHAP. II.

MY first *Demand* being *granted*, (as in the *Mathematicks* 'tis usual to *build* upon certain *Postulata*,) it does immediately follow, that [*man himself is the sole efficient cause of his eternal punishment*] (I say the *sole Cause*, as excluding *God*, but not the *Devil*; whom yet I also exclude from the *efficiency of the Cause*; because he only can *incite*, and *propose ill objects*, and

The first Inference.
Ὁ πάλαι αὐτῦ ὄκ ὄντι τῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ διάβολος αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ τῦ ποιητὴς γεγένηται, ὅπερ ἐκ τέχνων γίνεται.

add *perſwaſions* unto ſin, but cannot *force* or cauſe it in me, without my *will*, and *conſent*: ſo that the Devil being only a *Tempter*, and *Perſwader*, cannot (for That) be juſtly ſtyled an *efficient*. Or if he were, ſure for that very Reaſon God himſelf cannot be ſo: but only *Man* and the *Devil* muſt be the *Concauſes* of man's *Deſtruction*;) The ſecond thing I am to prove both by *Scripture*, and *Reaſon*, and the *ſuffrage* of *Antiquity*.

Ammonius in Joh. 8.
Our ſelves we condemn as the only cauſes of our own miſery.
Hook. l. 5. §. 72.

15. And here I ſhall not be ſo ſolicitous as to riffle my *Concordance*, but make uſe of ſuch Scriptures as lye uppermoſt in my *memory*, and ſo are readieſt to *meet* my pen. Theſe I find are of two ſorts, *negative* on God's part, and *affirmative* on *man*'s. God gives the firſt under his *oath*. (Ezek. 33. 11.) *As I live, ſaith the Lord, I have no pleaſure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your wicked waies, for why will ye die, O houſe of Iſrael?* In the 18. *chapter* of the ſame *Propheſie*, the *Latine* tranſlation is more *emphatical* then the *Engliſh*: for there it is not [*non cupio*] but [*nolo mortem morientis*] not that he does not *will* the death of a ſinner, but *that he wils it not*; he does not only *not deſire it*, but (which makes the proof ſtronger) *deſire's the contrary*, even *that he ſhould turn from his wickedneſſe and live*: (*cap.* 33. *v.* 14. *not willing* (ſaith S. *Peter*) *that Any ſhould periſh, but* (on the contrary) *that All ſhould come to Repentance.* And ſo (1 Tim. 2. 4.) *he will have all men to be ſaved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.* Where it appears by the Context, that the Apoſtle does not only ſpeak of *all kindes* of *particulars*, but of *all particulars* of the *kindes* too: For he firſt of all exhorts them, that *prayers, and ſupplications, and giving of thanks be made for all*

Proved by Scripture.
In the negative.
C. 18. v. 32.
2 Pet. 3. 9.

all men, (verſ. 1.) Secondly, he does *inſtance* in one *ſort* of men, *for Kings and all that are in Authority*, (ver 2.) Thirdly, he addes the *Cauſe* of his exhortation, *for this is good and acceptable in the ſight of God our Saviour; who will have All men to be ſaved*, (verſ. 3. 4.) And if the *Spaniſh frier* ſaid true, *that few Kings go to hell*, (giving this Reaſon) *becauſe all Kings are but few*, the *Apoſtles* way of arguing will be ſo much the *ſtronger*; for when he ſpeaks of *all men* ingenerall, he makes his inſtance in *Kings*, in *all Kings too without exception*, thereby intimating *Nero* the *worſt of Kings*, under whom at that time the *Apoſtle liv'd*. And he uſes another argument (verſ. 6.) becauſe Chriſt *gave himſelf a Ranſome for All*. This is yet more plain from *Rom.* 2. 4, 5. *Deſpiſeſt thou the riches of his goodneſſe, and forbearance and long-ſuffering, not knowing that the goodneſſe of God leadeth thee to repentance? but after thy hardneſſe and impenitent heart treaſureſt up unto thy ſelf wrath againſt the day of wrath?* Obſerve who they are whom God would have to *repent*; even the *hard hearted*, and the *impenitent*. But I have proofs out of Scripture, *leſſe liable* to *Cavil* then any of theſe, which yet I thought fit to uſe, becauſe I finde they are the *Chief* of thoſe that *Voſſius* relies upon, and expounds to my purpoſe from the *Authority* of the *Ancients*. Nor will I add to theſe Texts above three or four more, of which the one will ſo *eſtabliſh* and *explain* the other, as to leave no place of evaſion to the gainſayer. Firſt our bleſſed Saviour is call'd by the Apoſtle, *the Saviour of all men, eſpecially of them that beleeve*, (1 *Tim.* 4. 10.) as if the Apoſtle had *foreſeen* an objection, that the word [*all*] might be reſtrain'd unto the *houſhold of Faith*, he prevents it by a diſtinction of *general*, and *ſpecial*: for

Rom. 2. 5.

Veteris hac Eccleſiæ ſententia fuit, velle Deum converſionem ad ſalutem omnium, non tantùm genera ſingulorum, ſed ſingulos generum intelligens. Gerard. Voſſ. in Pelag. Hiſt. *l.* 7. Theſ. 2.

1 Tim. 4.10.

if he is a *special Saviour of beleevers*, he is a *general Saviour* of *unbeleevers*; not that These can be sav'd, whilst they are *obstinate unbeleevers*, but only upon *Condition* they will *repent and beleeve*. Else why should the Apostle affirm the *Saviour* to be of *All*, and then come off with an [*especially*] to them that *beleeve*? Certainly if 'tis *every man's duty* to *beleeve in* Christ, Christ *then dyed for every man*. And this very argument is not easily answer'd in the very confession of D. * *Twisse*; who yet does by and by say, 'tis easily answered, and yet he leaves it without an answer; only *scornes* it, & let's it *passe*.

* *Twiss. in Respons. ad Armin. præfat. p. 16. col. 2.*

2 Cor. 5.14.

This is secondly confirm'd from the Apostle's way of arguing (2 *Cor.* 5. 14.) *If one died for all, then were all dead*. This is the *major Proposition* of an *hypothetical Syllogisme*; in which the thing to *be proved* is, *that all were dead*; and the *Medium* to *prove* it is, *that one died for all*. Now every man knows (who understands how to reason) that the *argument of proof* must be rather *more*, then *lesse* known, then the thing *in question* to be proved: so that if it be *clear*, that *all men were dead* by the fall of the *first Adam*, it must be *clearer* (as *S. Paul* argues) that *life was offer'd unto all*, by the death of the *second Adam*; and if none were *died for* but the *Elect*, then the *Elect* only were *dead*: for the word [*all*] must signifie as *amply* in the *Assumption*, as it does in the *Sequel*; or else the *Reasoning* will be *fallacious* and *imperfect*. The Apostle thus argues,

If one died for all, then were all dead;
But one died for all; (*that must be the Assumption*)
Therefore all were dead.

Whosoever here denies the *Minor*, does (before he is aware) condemn the *Sequel* of the *Major*; and so gives

gives the *Lie* to the very words of the *Text*; which I can look for from none, unleſſe from ſome impure Hereticks, who would conclude the greateſt *falſhoods* from the word of *Truth*. This is thirdly confirmed from the ſaying of the Apoſtle, (*Rom.* 11. 32.) *that God concluded all in unbelief* (the *Gentiles* firſt, verſ. 30. and afterwards the *Jewes*, verſ. 31.) *that he might have mercy upon all*; from whence I inferr, that if this laſt [*all*] belong to *none* but the *Elect*, then none but the *Elect* were concluded in *unbelief*. But 'tis plain that *all* without *exception* were (firſt or laſt) concluded in *unbelief*, therefore the *mercy* was meant to *all* without *exception*. Laſtly, it is confirm'd from thoſe *falſe Prophets and falſe Teachers*, (2 *Pet.* 2. 1.) who though *privily bringing in damnable hereſies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bringing upon themſelves ſwift deſtruction*, yet it ſeems they were ſuch whom *the Lord had bought*. So far is God from being the *Cauſe* of mans *deſtruction*, by an *abſolute*, *irreſpective*, *unconditional Decree*, that he gave himſelf a *ranſom* for them *that periſh*. They were not left out of the *bargain* which was made with his *Juſtice*, for the Apoſtle tels us plainly they were actually *bought*. He whoſe *bloud* was *ſufficient* for *Ten thouſands worlds*, would not grudge its *extent* to the *major part* of but *one*: he was *merciful* to *all men*, but the *greateſt part* of men are *unmerciful* to *themſelves*. He is the *Saviour of all*, but yet all are *not ſaved*; even becauſe he only *offers*, does not *obtrude* himſelf upon us. He * *offers* himſelf to *all*, but *moſt refuſe* to *receive* him. He will have *no man* to periſh, but repent, by his *Antecedent will*; but by his *Conſequent will* he will have every man to periſh who is *impenitent*. Which is ſufficient to have been ſaid for the *negative part*

Rom 11.31.

2 Per. 2. 1.

* *Gratiam ſalutarem non exiſtimo conferri omnibus, ſed tamen omnibus* offerri; *& præſto eſſe Deum ut conferatur.* Epiſc. Wint. de Artic. Lamb.

of my undertaking, [*That the cauſe of Damnation is not on God's part*] in which, if any one Text be found of power to *Convince*, let no man cavil at thoſe others which ſeem to them *leſſe* Convincing. If any one has an objection, let him ſtay for an anſwer till his objection has been urged. It might ſeem too eaſie, to *ſolve objections* of mine *own choice*, or *confute* an *argument* of mine *own making*; and therefore I paſſe (without notice of common ſhifts, and ſubterfuges, till I am call'd to that *Drudgery*,) to the *ſecond part* of my enterpriſe, which is the *affirmative*.

Omnibus offertur Dei miſericordia. Nemo illius expers eſt, niſi qui renuit. Bernard. ſerm. 1. in purif. Mar.

In the Affirmative.

16. [*That man himſelf is the cauſe of his eternall puniſhment.*] Which though ſuppoſed in the *negative*, muſt yet be prov'd to ſome perſons, who are prevail'd upon by *faſhions*, and *modes* of ſpeech; and will *deny* that very thing when they ſee it in *one colour*, which they will preſently *aſſent* to, when they behold it in *another*. He who is very loth to ſay, that *God is the Author of ſin and damnation*, will many times ſay it in *other terms*; and therefore, in *other terms*, it muſt be proved that *he is not*. *O Iſrael thou haſt deſtroyed thy ſelf, but in me is thine help*, (*Hoſea* 13. 6.) They that privily bring in Damnable Hereſies *ſhall bring upon themſelves ſwift deſtruction*. *The fooliſhneſſe of man perverteth his way*: and as when *luſt conceiveth it bringeth forth ſin, ſo ſin when it is finiſhed, bringeth forth death*, (*Jam.* 1. 15.) If death is that *monſter*, of which ſin is the *Dam*, that *brings it forth*, how *foul* a thing muſt be the *Sire*? and can there be any greater *blaſphemy*, then to bring God's *Providence* into the *pedegree* of *Death*? *Death* (ſaith the Apoſtle) *is the wages of ſin*, (*Rom.* 6. 23.) And *wages* is not an *abſolute*, but a *relative* word. It is but rea-

Hoſ. 13. 6. 2 Pet. 2. 1. Prov. 19. 3.

Jam. 1. 15.

Rom. 6. 23.

ſon

ſon he ſhould be *paid it*, who hath dearly *earn'd* it by his *work*. It is the ſturdy *will* of man that is *the ſervant of ſin*. *Diſobedience* is the *work*, *Death* eternal is the *wages*, and the *Devil* is the *pay-maſter*; who as he *ſets* men to *work* to the *diſhonour* of their *Creator*, ſo he *paies* them their wages to the advancement of his *glory*. From whence I Conclude, (with the *Book* of *Wiſdome*,) *God made not death, neither hath he pleaſure in the deſtruction of the living: for he created all things that they might have their being, and the generations of the world were healthful, and there is no poyſon of Deſtruction in them, nor the kingdome of death upon the earth. But ungodly men with their words and works call'd it to them, and made a Covenant with it*; becauſe they are worthy to take [μερίδα] part with it. Verſ. 20. Wiſd. 1. 13. 14, 15, 16,

17. I will confirm this truth by no more then one Reaſon; which, if it is not the *beſt*, doth ſeem to me to be the *fitteſt*; as being apteſt to evince both the *connexion*, and *neceſſity*, of my *firſt inference*, from my *firſt Principle*. It is taken from the *nature* and *uſe* of *Puniſhment*; which as ſoon as it is nam'd, does *ſuppoſe* a *Guilt*; for as every *ſin* is the * *tranſgreſſion of ſome Law*, ſo every *puniſhment* is a *revenge* on ſome *ſin*. From whence it followes, that if a mans *ſin is from himſelf*, 'tis *from himſelf* that *he is puniſht*. And as the *Law* is not the *Cauſe*, but the * *Occaſion* only of ſin; ſo God is not the *Cauſe*, but the *Inflicter* only of *puniſhment*: for ſo ſaies the Apoſtle, *Sin taking occaſion by the Commandment wrought in me all manner of Concupiſcence: for without the Law ſin was dead. That which is good not being made death, but ſin working death by that which is good.* God and his *Law*, are, each of them, the *Cauſa-ſine-qua-non*, the *Condition without which*, ſin and puniſhment could not have been, (for *without* *Proved ſecondly by Reaſon.* * Ἀφορμὴ. * Rom. 7.8. Verſ. 13.

without Law, *no ſin*, and *without* God, *no Reprobation*,) but not the *Energetical efficient Cauſe*, of which ſin and puniſhment were the *neceſſary effects*. For if God had made *an Hell* by an *abſolute purpoſe*, becauſe *he would* that ſome ſhould *ſuffer* it, and not in a *prævious intuition* of their ſins; *Damnation* had been a *Miſery*, but not a *Puniſhment*: as if a *Potter* makes a *veſſel* on purpoſe that he may *break it*, (which yet none but a mad man will ever do,) or if a man meerly for *recreation* cuts up *Animals alive*, (which yet none ever did that I can hear of, except a *young Spaniſh Prince*,) it is indeed an *infelicity*, and a *Torment*, but no more properly a *puniſhment*, then it is *any thing elſe*. Indeed the *Common people*, who do not underſtand the *juſt propriety of words*, make no diſtinction many times betwixt *Pain*, and *Puniſhment*; not conſidering that *Puniſhment* is a *Relative word*, of which the *correlative* is *Breach of Law*; and therefore is fitly expreſt in Scripture by the mutual relation betwixt a *Parent*, *and a Child*. When luſt hath *conceived* it *bringeth forth* ſin; ſin being perfected *bringeth forth death*, * (*Jam.* 1. 15.) which is as much as to ſay, (according to the *propriety* of the *Apoſtles own words*) *ſin is the parent*, *and death is the child*. Now there cannot be a *Child without* a *parent*; (they being *relata ſecundum eſſe*;) much leſſe can the child be *before* the parent; (for *ſunt ſimul natura*, *& dicuntur ad convertentiam*.) Whereupon it muſt follow, that *puniſhment* could not be *ordained* by God, either *without* ſin, or *before it*, or *without any reſpect*, *or any intuition* of it, (which yet the great * Mr. *Calvin* does plainly ſay.) I ſay it *could not*, becauſe it implies a *contradiction*. For though God could very eaſily make *Adam* out of the *earth*, and the *earth*

* Jam. 1. 15. Συλλαβοῦσα. Τίκτει. Ἀποκυεῖ. Τὴν λύσιν ἀποκυῆσαι. *Apud Lucianum dr.*

* *Ideo præſciverit, quia decreto ſuo ſic ordinavit.* & for no other reaſon, *Niſi quia Deo ita viſum eſt.* Calvin. Inſtit. l. 3. c. 23. 6. 7. p. 325.

Non percipit ſe dicere, ea quæ vera ſunt, eo ipſo quòd vera ſunt, falſa ſint. Auguſt. contra Fauſtum.

earth out of *nothing*, yet he could not make a *sinful Cain* to be the *son of sinful Adam*, *before* there was an *Adam*, much lesse before there was a *sinful one* : because it were to *be*, and *not to be* at the same time ; *Adam* would be a *Cause*, before an *Entity* ; which God Almighty *cannot* effect, even because he is *Almighty*. So that when the *Romanists* assert their *Transubstantiation*, or *the posterity of Marcion* their *Absolute decree* of *all* the *evil* in the *world*, (both pretending a *Reverence* to God's *Omnipotence*,) they do as good as say this, *That the things which are true may therefore be false, because they are true* ; or that God is *so Almighty*, *as to be able not to be God* : the best Result of an *Ability*, to *verifie two parts of a contradiction*. (So said *Austin* against *Faustus*, and *Origen* against *Celsus*.) Whensoever it is said, [*God can do all things*] 'tis meant of *all things that become him*. So *Isidore* the *Pelusiote*. But (to return to that argument in the pursuit of which I have stept somewhat too forwards) if Gods *præordination* of mans *eternal misery* were in order of nature *before* his *præscience* of mans *sin*, as Mr. *Calvin* evidently affirms in his [Ideo * *præsciverit*, quia *decreto suo præordinavit*,] setting *Præordination* as the *Cause*, or *Reason*, or *prævious Requisite* to his *Præscience*,) either mans *Reprobation* must come to passe *without sin*, or else he must sin to bring it *orderly to passe* ; which is to make God the author either of *misery by it self* without relation unto sin, or else of *sin* in *order* to *misery*. The first cannot be, because God hath * sworn, he *hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner*, (*Ezek*.33.44.) much lesse in *His death who never sin'd*. And because, if it were *so*, the Scriptures would not use the word *Wages*, and the word *Punishment*, and the word *Retribution*,

Οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ τῷ Θεός. *Origen. contra Celsum l.* 4.

Isidorus Pelusiota quærenti, εἰ Θεῷ πάντα δυνατὰ, *respondit*, πάντα πρέποντα αὐτῷ.

* *Loco superiùs paulò citato.*

* *Idcirco jurat, ut si non credimus promittenti Deo, credamus saltem pro salute juranti.* Hieron. Epist. 46.

O beatos nos, quorum causa Deus jurat! O miserrimos si nec juranti credimus. Tertul. l. de Pœnit. c. 4.

tion, and the word *Reward*. *Hell* indeed had been a *Torment*, but not a *Recompence*; a *fatal Misery*, but not a *Mulct*; an *Act of power*, but not of *vengance*; which yet in many places is the *style* that *God speaks in*, *Vengeance* is mine, and I will *repay*, *Rom.* 12. 19. Nor can the *second* be lesse impossible, it having formerly been prov'd, that God is not the Author of sin; * *he hath no need of the sinful man*, whereby to bring mans *Ruin* the more *conveniently about*; and most of them that dare say it, are fain to say it in a *Disguise*. Some indeed are for [*ligonem ligonem*,] but the more *modest blasphemers* are glad to dresse it in *cleaner phrase*. A strange προτέρον in Divinity, to put the 1 *childe before the parent*, the 2 *wages before the work*, the 3 *end before the means*, *the Reprobation before the sin*! yet so they do who make the *Decree* of *Reprobation* most *irrespective* and *unconditional*; and after that, say, that *whom God determines to the end*, *he determines to the means*. To *put the horse upon the Bridle*, is a more *rational Hypallage*: for by this kind of Theologie, eternal punishment is imputed to Gods *Antecedent will* (which is called the *first*) and *sin* to his *consequent will*, (which is the *second*.) The first προηγουμένως, and the other only ἐπομένως, punishment *chiefly*, and sin by way of *Consecution*. Men are bid not to sin *ex voluntate signi*, or *revelata*; but are determin'd to it *ex voluntate occulta*, or *beneplaciti*. *Distinctions* very *good*, when at first they were invented for *better uses*. The former by *S. Chrysostome*, from whom it was *borrow'd* by *Damascene*, and from him by the *Schoolmen*. But I say they all were us'd to very contrary purposes, by *them*, and by *these*, who endeavour'd to *repel* those Fathers with their own *weapons*, (as the elaborate *Gerard Vossius* does very largely

* Eccles. 15. 12.

1 Jam. 1. 15.
2 Rom. 6. 23.
3 Rom. 6. 21.

Poterit Deus velle voluntate signi & approbante, ut homo non labatur; interea voluntate beneplaciti statuere potest gratiam efficacem negare, ex quo infallibiliter & efficaciter sequetur ut labatur. Twiss. in vind. Grat. l. 1. de præd. ◊. 12. p. 140. *Voss. Pelag. Hist. lib. 6. Thes.* 2.

largely make appear.) I am ſorry I muſt ſay, (what yet *I muſt* (ſaith * *Tertullian*) when it *may tend to edification*) That the *Lord God merciful*, and *gracious*, *long-ſuffering*, *abundant in goodneſſe and truth*, who is *all Bowels*, and no gall, who *hateth nothing that he hath made*, who in the *midſt of Judgement remembreth mercy*, *forgiving iniquity*, *tranſgreſſion*, *and ſin*, is exhibited to the world by the *Authors* and *Abettors* of *unconditional Reprobation*, as a *kinde of Platonick Lover of* ſo *excellent* a *Creature's everlaſting miſery*. Which if Mr. *Calvin* himſelf *confeſſed* to be an * *Horrible Decree*, (who yet *beleev'd* it,) how *frightful* muſt that opinion appear to *me*, who did therefore not believe it, becauſe it *frighted* me *into my wits?* For to ſay that God is ἀνδροκτόνος, *a ſlayer of men* from *all eternity*, (who is *the Lamb ſlain*, that is, *a Saviour*, *from the Foundation of the world*, (*Rev.*13.8.) is to affirm *that* of *him*, which he affirmed of the *Devil*, who is called by our *Saviour*, *A Murderer from the beginning*, *Joh.* 8. 44. Which the Devil could not be, if God had *abſolutely willed* the *Death* of any, without *reſpect* or *relation* to the *ſnares* of the *Devil*; it being impoſſible to *murder the Dead*; or to *ſlay* thoſe that were *kill'd* long *before* they were *born*. I know by whom it is anſwer'd, [That God doth *will ſin*, not as it is ſin, but as it is a *Medium* for the ſetting forth of his *Glory*; and ſo *Damnation*.] But whilſt men *finde* out *Diſtinctions* to *excuſe* God Almighty, they do imply him to have *offended*. A thing which I am now ſo very *weary* even to *think on*, that I haſten, for ſome *refreſhment*, to my *third proof* of this *Inference*, to wit from the *ſuffrage* of *Antiquity*.

18. Before I name any particular, I will take the confidence to ſay in general, That all the *Greek* and *Latine*

* *Quod dicere periculoſum, ad ædificationem proferendum eſt.* Tertul. de pœn. cap. 5.

* *Decretum horribile quidem fateor, inficiari tamen nemo poterit.* Calvin. Inſtit. l. 3. c. 23. §. 7.

L. 1. *part.* 1. §. 13. *p.* 140.

Proved thirdly by Antiquity.

Fathers before S. Austin, and even *Austin* himself before his contention against *Pelagius*, (and even during that contention in some *places* of his *works*) besides those *many Fathers* who lived *after him*, were *unanimously* of this Judgement, *That God did not absolutely decree the Reprobation of any Creature, but upon præscience and supposition of wilful rebellion and impenitence.* I have not liv'd long enough to read them all, but I have *dipt* into the *most*: and by the help of such *Collectors* as I have gotten into my Study, (whereof *Vossius* hath good reason to be the Chief upon *this occasion*: and I the rather use *him*, because I find him so very punctual in every one of the quotations, which I have had the *opportunity* to make *trial of*) I say, by the *help* of such *credible Compilers*, I shall give in a *cloud of witnesses* (I hope) sufficiently *Authentick*. I love as little to be *Voluminous*, as *Callimachus* would have me, (*cui* μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακὸν) and therefore shall set down only the *Substance* of what the Fathers have said, referring the *Reader*, by my *Citations*, *to the larger fields* of their *Discourses*.

Ignatius in ep. ad Magnes. p. 53. edit. Usser. Justin. Martyr. in Apolog. prima pro Christianis pap. 35. edit. Sylburg. 1597.

Ἐὰν ᾠσεβῇ τις, ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Διαβόλου οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης γινόμενος.

Ὅτι αὐτεξούσιον τότε τῶν Ἀγγέλων γένος καὶ τῶν Ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς, δικαίως ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πλημμελήσωσι, τὴν τιμωρίαν ὀναιωνίῳ πυρὶ κομίσονται.

Tertull. contra Marcion. l. 1. c. 24. edit. Jun. A. D. 1597.

Pluribus pereuntibus, quomodo defenditur perfecta bonitas? *ex majore parte cessatrix, paucis aliqua, pluribus nulla cedens perditioni*, partiaria exitii? *Quod si plures salvi non erunt, erit jam non bonitas, sed malitia perfectior. --- magis autem non faciens salvos, dum paucos facit*, perfectior erit in non juvando. *---suæ potestatis invenio hominem à Deo constitutum, ---lapsumque hominis non Deo, sed libero ejus Arbitrio deputandum.* (I wonder *Vossius* did not take

Lib. 2. c. 5. 6.

take in *Tertullian*, then whom there is not any one more directly for this purpose. *Justin Martyr* also was ill omitted; and so was *S. Ignatius.*)

Ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς οὐ θέλων τινὰς γενέσθαι βέλτιον. οἱ δὲ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἀπῃτήκασιν. — ὃ τῆς ἀπειρίας πολλῆς. Τὸν κύριον ἀπαιχύνεσθε, ἐλεύθεριαν ἐπαγγέλλεται, ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰς δουλείαν ἀποδιδράσκετε.

Διὰ τοῦτο Θεὸς βουλόμενος ἀπαρίστησιν τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν.

Ignem autem æternum non illis, *quibus dicitur* [*discedite à me maledicti*] *paratum ostendit, sicut regnum justis, sed* Diabolo, *& Angelis ejus: quia quantum ad se, homines non ad perditionem creavit, sed ad vitam æternam & gaudium.* (Note that *Chrysostome*, *Theophylact*, and *Euthymius*, interpret those words of *Christ*, as *Origen* doth.)

Τί δὲ ἐκ ὁ Θεὸς ἐποίει τότε, ἀφ' οὗ ἐκ ἐθέλησε γενέσθαι;

Ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς, ἵνα δείξῃ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ σπλάγχνα, πάντας δέχεται, πᾶσαν σφραίνει. Et alibi, αὐτὸς πολὺ σπλαγχνίζεται ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, μακροθυμῶν, πότε ἀπιστρέψαντες σφοδρὰ θυμῷ σφῇς αὐτόν.

Τιμωρία, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον κρῖμα τοῦ Θεοῦ. ζωὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ θελήματι αὐτοῦ Τί δὲ φησὶν; ὅτι ὁ μὴ θέλει ὁ Θεὸς τοῦτό ἐστι, πάντας μετέχειν αὐτοῦ τῆς ζωῆς.

Ideo venit Dominus Jesus ut salvum faceret quod perierat. Venit ergo ut peccatum mundi tolleret, ut vulnera nostra curaret, Sed quia non omnes medicinam expetunt, sed plerique Refugiunt, ---ideo volentes curat, non adstringit invitos.

Non injustè judicat, quia omnes vult salvos fieri, manente justitia. ---Deus utique vult omnes salvos fieri. Cur non impletur ejus voluntas? Sed in omni locutione, sensus est, conditio latet. *Vult* omnes *salvos fieri,* si accedant *ad eum: non enim sic vult, ut nolentes salventur, sed vult illos salvari, si & ipsi velint: nam legem omnibus dedit, nullum excepit à salute.*

Clemens Alex. ὁ προτρεπτ. p. 24. edit. Commel. vide *& Clem. Rom. l. 1. Διαταγῶν, cap. 45. Theophil. ad Autol. l. 3. p. 336. edit. Basil. 1555. Origen. tract. 34. in Matth. p. 194.*

Athanas. orat. de incarn. verbi Dei. T. 1. p. 45. Macarius Homil. 26. p. 230. Homil. 30 p. 53. Basil. Homil. in Psal. 29. p. 80. Ambros. 2. de secundâ interpellat. David. c. 11.

Hilarius Diacon. in epist. Pauli in Rom. c. 3. & 9. Idem ad 1 Tim. 11.

* *Chryſoſt. in 1 Tim. lc. 2. p. 1556. Idem ad Epheſ. c. 1. Hom. 1. p. 1036.*

* Μιμῶ τῷ Θεῷ, ὃς πάντας θέλει σωθῆναι, εἰκότως· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἀπάντων δεῖται· ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ μόνων. Εἰ πάντας αὐτὸς ἠθέλησε σωθῆναι, θέλε κἀγὼ σύ· Εἰ δὲ θέλεις, ἔσῃ. —παίζω μὲν οὐδαμῶς, τὸ θέλημα δὲ τὸ προηγούμενον ἴστε γὰρ κἀκεῖνο θέλημα· δύο θέλημα πρῶτον, τὸ μὴ κολάζειν ἁμαρτάνοντας· θέλημα δεύτερον, τὸ γενομένους κακοὺς κολάζειν. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνάγκην αὐτοὺς κολάζειν, ἀλλὰ θέλημα. —ἐνδέχεται οὖν τὸ πρῶτον θέλημα. Τὸ προηγούμενον θέλημα, τὸ μετ' ὀδυνηρίας θέλημα. —τίνος ἕνεκεν οὖν τῶν φιλῶ; ὑπὸ μόνης ἀγαθότητος. Ἡ γὰρ χάρις ἀγαθότης ἐστί.

Hieronymus adverſ. Pelagianos l. 2. ſub finem & ad Eph. c. 1.

Miſeratur humano generi Deus, & non vult perire quod fecit. Vult Deus quæcunque ſunt plena rationis & conſilii. Vult ſalvari omnes & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Sed quia nullus abſque propria voluntate ſervatur, (liberi enim arbitrii ſumus) vult nos bonum velle, ut cum voluerimus, velit in nobis & ipſe ſuum implere conſilium.

Primaſius in 1 Tim. 2.

Conſtat Deum omnia bona velle, ſed homines ſuo vitio præcipitantur in malum.

Damaſcenus l. 2. orth. fid. c. 29.

Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὡς ὁ Θεὸς προηγεμένως θέλει πάντας σωθῆναι, καὶ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ τυχεῖν. Οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ κολάσαι ἔπλασεν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ σπεῖρε τὸ μεταχεῖν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀγαθός. Ἁμαρτάνουσι δὲ θέλει κολάζεσθαι ὡς δίκαιος. Λέγεται οὖν τὸ πρῶτον προηγεμένον θέλημα, καὶ εὐδοκία ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄν. Τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐπόμενον θέλημα, καὶ παραχώρησις ἐξ ἡμετέρας αἰτίας. —ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη· ἐπεὶ γὰρ θέλων κρίνει, φησὶ καὶ τὸ προηγεμένον θέλημα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπόμενον. —καὶ τὸ μὲν προηγεμένον θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ, τῆς ἀγαθότητός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἐπόμενον, τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ.

Idem contra Manichæos p. 375. edit Baſil. 1578. Oecumenius ad 1 Tim. 2.

Ἐι θέλει ὁ Θεὸς [πάντας εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν] τί μὴ γίνεται ὃ θέλει; ἢ γίνεται, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οὐ θέλουσιν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην ποιεῖ ὁ Θεός.

Anſelmus in Matth. c. 6.

Duæ ſunt voluntates in Deo. Una miſericordiæ, *quæ non eſt cogens, nec aliquid libero arbitrio aufert. Qua omnes homines vult ſalvos fieri, quod tamen in libera voluntate illorum poſitum eſt. Eſt alia, quæ eſt de effectibus rerum, de qua dicitur, [omnia quæcunque voluit, fecit.] huic nemo poteſt reſiſtere. De qua dicitur, Voluntati ejus quis reſiſtit? (atque hæc eſt duplex,* permittens, *reſpectu mali;* approbans, *reſpectu boni.) Itaque homines reſiſtunt* voluntati miſericordiæ, *& non reſiſtunt* voluntati juſtitiæ.

(*Poſtea*

(*Poſtea in hunc ſenſum.*) *Orate ergo*, fiat voluntas tua, *ſicut in cœlo* (*ubi non reſiſtitur*) *ſic & in terris, ubi reſiſtitur.*

Deus ex ſe ſumit ſeminarium miſerendi. Quod judicat & condemnat nos, eum quodammodo cogimus, *ut longè aliter de corde ipſius miſeratio, quàm animadverſio procedere videatur. ---omnibus offertur, & in communi poſita eſt Dei miſericordia; nemo illius expers eſt, niſi qui renuit.*

Bernardus ſerm. 5. in Natal. Dom. Idem ſerm. 1. in purif. Mar.

If after all theſe teſtimonies, I have *S. Auſtin* and *Proſper* to ſide with me in my aſſertion, I know not why I may not ſeem, to thoſe who think me in an error, at leaſt to have *rationally* and *diſcreetly erred*: and though *Grotius* gives a reaſon why *S. Auſtin* is the unfitteſt to be a *Judge* in theſe matters, yet if *Proſper* (who beſt knew him) may be allowed for his *Interpreter*, I am very well content that he be one of my *Jury*; for of *four Expoſitions* which that Father made (in ſeveral parts of his writings) upon 1 *Tim.* 2. 4. [*God will have all men to be ſaved,*] I finde *one* very directly juſt ſuch as I would have it; and it is even in thoſe writings which he pen'd after the Hereſie of *Pelagius* was on foot; which is therefore with me of very great *moment* and *Authority*.

Grotius in Rivet. Apolog. Diſcuſ. p. 97. 98.

To this Queſtion,

De bonâ voluntate unde ſit, ſi naturâ, cur non omnibus, cùm ſit idem Deus omnium Creator? ſi dono Dei, etiam hoc quare non omnibus, cùm homines velit ſalvos fieri.

He thus Anſwers,

Auſtin. in lib. de ſpiritu & literâ ad Marcelllinum c. 33.

Vult Deus omnes homines ſalvos fieri, non ſic tamen ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, *quo vel bene vel malè utentes* juſtiſſimè judicentur. *Quod quum ſit, Infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cùm ejus Evangelio non credunt: nec ideo tamen eam vincunt, verùm ſeipſos fraudant magno & ſummo bono, maliſque pœnalibus implicant,*

cant, experturi in ſuppliciis poteſtatem ejus, cujus in donis miſericordiam contemſerunt.

Idem ſerm. 38. de Sanctis.

Inevitabilis illa ſententia, [diſcedite à me maledicti] *à piiſſimo Deo ideo multo antè prædicitur, ut à nobis totis viribus caveatur: ſi enim nos Deus noſter vellet punire, non nos ante tot ſecula commoneret. Invitus quodam modo vindicat, qui quomodo evadere poſſimus, multo antè demonſtrat: non enim te vult percutere, qui tibi clamat,* obſerva.

'Tis very true that S. *Auſtin* did ſometimes let fall ſuch expreſſions, (tranſported ſometimes in the heat of his diſpute) as rais'd ſome calumnies after his death, as if he had thought that *God created the greateſt part of mankinde on purpoſe to do the will, not of God, but of the Devil.* But *Proſper* made it appear, in his Anſwers to *that* and the like Objections, that they who cenſur'd *Auſtin's Judgement*, were ſeduced to it by his *ſtyle:* and that (notwithſtanding the misfortune of his expreſſions) *Auſtin's* judgement and his *owne*, was clearly this (and ſo * *Fulgentius* doth profeſſe to underſtand it.)

* *Nihil aliud accipiendum in iſto Auguſtini ſermone exiſtimo, quo ad interitum quoſdam prædeſtinatos firmat, &c.* Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1.

Proſper (ſeu Auguſt.) ad object. Vicen. Artic. 2. & ſeqq.

---*Syncerиſſimè credendum atque profitendum eſt, Deum velle ut omnes homines ſalvi fiant. Siquidem Apoſtolus, cujus iſta ſententia eſt, ſolliciti ſſimè præcipit, ut Deo pro omnibus hominibus ſupplicetur: ex quibus* quòd multi pereunt, pereuntium eſt meritum; *quòd multi ſalvantur, ſalvantis eſt donum.* --- Nemo ab eo ideo creatus eſt, ut periret: *quia* alia eſt cauſa Naſcendi, alia Pereundi. *Vt enim naſcantur homines, conditoris eſt beneficium; ut autem pereant, prævaricatoris eſt meritum.* ---*Inſanum omnino eſt dicere,* Voluntatem Dei ex Dei voluntate non fieri; *& Damnatorem Diaboli ejúſque famulorum, velle ut Diabolo ſerviatur.* ---*Nullo modo credendum homines---ex Dei voluntate cecidiſſe, cùm potius allevet Dominus omnes qui corruunt,*

corruunt, & erigat omnes elisos. ---*Dei ergo voluntas est, ut in bonâ voluntate maneatur.* Qui & priusquam deseratur, neminem deserit. *Et multos* desertores sæpe convertit. ---*Deus nec quæ illuminavit, obcæcat; nec quæ ædificavit, destruit; nec quæ plantavit, evellit.* Quia præsciti sunt casuri, non sunt prædestinati. *Essent* autem prædestinati, si essent reversuri, & in sanctitate ac veritate mansuri: *ac per hoc prædestinatio Dei multis* est Causa standi, nemini est Causa labendi. ---*Hi* cùm à pietate deficiunt, non ex Dei opere, sed ex sua voluntate deficiunt. Casuri *tamen &* recessuri *ab eo, qui falli non potest*, præsciuntur. ---*Denique* qui voluntatem spreverunt invitantem, voluntatem Dei sentient vindicantem.

Ὁ Διάβολος τὴν πρῶτον ἀπατήσας τὴν ἄνθρωπον, θνητὸν τὸ γένος διὰ τῆς ἐκείνου παραβάσεως ἀπειργάσατο. Theodor. Heracl. in Joh. 8. 44.

Anathema illi qui per Dei præscientiam in mortem hominem deprimi dixerit. Synod. Arelatensis.

Suo prorsus decipiuntur Arbitrio, suâ voluntate labuntur, & si in hac desidiâ perseverent, ipsi se his quæ accepere, despoliant. Scriptor de vocat. Gent. l. 2. cap. 11.

Quos præscivit Deus homines vitam in peccato terminaturos, prædestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos. Fulgentius ad Monimum. l. 1.

* Lastly, that this is precisely the Judgement of the *Church of England*, I cannot better prove then by that *sense* and *apprehension* which *Bishop Overal* had of it; who does professedly interpret the *minde* of her *Articles* in this particular, and was as well able to do it, as any man that ever liv'd.

---*Sub* generali *promissione & præcepto tutò quisque potest indubiâ fide se includere: & cum certâ spe ac fiduciâ ad thronum gratiæ accedere, veréque cognoscere, si non* confi-

* *Causam Reprobationis certum est hanc esse, viz. peccatum in hominibus.* Melancthon in locis Theolog. de prædest. p. 316. 317. *Idem ubiq; ait* Petrus Molinæus in sua anatome Arminianismi. D. *Overallus Theol. Cantab. professor de sententiâ Ecclesiæ Anglic. &c. cap. 1.*

dat *Deo* promittenti, & mandanti obsequatur, suam culpam esse, *non Dei*: *idque per* negligentiam suam, non gratiæ divinæ defectum accidere. ---*Ordo divinæ prædestinationis nostræ in Articulo septimo iste videtur intentus; Deum præscium lapsus generis humani ad remedium ejusdem filium mittendum decrevisse, in eóque salutis conditionem statuisse; tum ad eam in animis hominum producendam* necessaria & sufficientia *media & auxilia* omnibus generatim *secundum* magis & minus *ordinâsse, quæ* magis speciatim *his quos in Christo elegit ex reliquo hominum genere pro suo beneplacito cumularet, quibus hi ad fidem, perseverantiam & æternam salutem certissimè perducantur, &* reliqui nihil habeant quod conquerantur, &c.

Cap. 2. de morte Christi. *De morte Christi tam plena & ubiq; sibi constans Ecclesiæ nostræ sententia,* pro omnibus omnino hominibus, *sive pro* omnibus omnium hominum peccatis, *Jesum Christum mortuum esse, ut* mirandum sit ullos ex nostris id in controversiam vocare.

Artic. 2. *Pro omnibus actualibus hominum peccatis, non tantùm pro culpâ Originis.*

Artic. 7. Artic. 31. *Æterna vita humano generi est proposita.*

Oblatio Christi semel facta perfecta est Redemptio, propitiatio & satisfactio pro omnibus peccatis totius mundi tam originalibus quàm actualibus.

Calvin. ad Heb. 9. 28. Idem ad Rom. 5. It is farther observ'd by that most moderate and learned man, that Mr. *Calvin himself*, however *rigid* he was in *some* places, did yet so *soberly* contradict himself in *others*, that those very texts of Scripture in which it is affirmed [*Christ dyed for many*] he so interprets as to say, the word [*many*] signifie's [*all*] as *Heb. 9. 28.* and that many are not saved is (saith he) for this reason, [*quia eos impedit sua incredulitas*] *because they are hindred by their own incredulity.* 19. I

19. I have not tranſlated theſe Authorities, becauſe they are principally meant for ſuch as are able to underſtand them. And if any *plain Reader* ſhall deſire to have them in the *Groſſe* without being troubled to ſuffer them over in the *Retail*, he may be pleas'd to receive it in theſe following words: *That God did not abſolutely, irreſpectively, unconditionally decree the everlaſting miſery of any one, but in a foreſight and intuition of their refuſing his proffer. That he ſent his ſon to dye for all the ſins of the whole world, inviting and commanding all men every where to repent* [and be forgiven] (Act. 17. 30.) *but that moſt, like the ſlave in* Exodus, *are in love with their bondage; and will be bored through the ear. That everlaſting fire was prepared eſpecially, (not for men, but) for the Devil and his Angels; nor for them by a peremptory irreſpective Decree, but in præſcience and reſpect of their pride and Apoſtaſie. That Chriſt came to ſave that which was loſt, and to call ſinners to Repentance, and to have gather'd them as a Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, but they would not. That God gave his law, his rule, his promiſes to all, and excepted none in the publiſhing of either; but ſo as he expected they ſhould be willing as well as he; for he would not ſave any whether they would or no. That God Almighty made no man on purpoſe to torment him, but that he might participate of his goodneſſe. "That ſo many as periſh may "thank themſelves; and that ſo many as live for ever, are "beholding to nothing but the Grace of God. That God "Decreed the fall of none, but the raiſing up of thoſe were "down: and that thoſe very men who are reprobated had "been predeſtin'd to ſalvation, if they would have return'd "and remain'd in truth and holineſſe. Gods Decrees being "to many the cauſe of their riſe, but to none of their downfal.*

The *Engliſh Reader* may be pleas'd to obſerve, that theſe laſt words are tranſlated out of *Proſper* in his vindication of *Auguſtine* his deareſt *friend*, who is the only Father (I can hear of) whom our *Adverſaries* are willing to be *tryed* by in this buſineſſe. (See the Confeſſion of Dr. *Twiſſ. in Vindic. Grat. l. 1. Dign. 8. §. 4. p. 110.*

"fal. Laſtly, that they who have deſpis'd the will of God "which did invite them to repentance, ſhall feel the terrors "of his will, which is to execute vengeance upon the children "of diſobedience.

The Reſult of all.

20. From all this together which hath been ſaid from *Scripture*, from *Reaſon*, from the *Authority* of the *Ancients*, (who are ſure the moſt fit to *interpret* Scripture) I thus conclude within my ſelf. That *God Almighty* is the *Author* of *men* and *Angels*; That *wicked Angels* and *wicked men* are the *Authors* of *ſin*; and that the *ſin* of *men* and *Angels* is the *Author* of unexpreſſible and *endleſſe puniſhment*. That *ſin* is *Rebellion* againſt the *Majeſty* of God: That *hell* was made to puniſh *Rebels*; and that God never *decreed* any *Rebellion againſt himſelf*. From whence it followes, that as I look for the *Cauſe* of my *election*, in the *ſole merits* of my *Redeemer*, ſo for the *cauſe* of my *Reprobation*, in the *obliquity* of my *will*: becauſe the *Reaſon* of my *puniſhment* is to be taken from my *ſin*; and the *Reaſon* of my *ſin* is to be taken from my *ſelf*: from whence there followes (and follow it *will*, do what I *can*) A *ſecond Inference* from my *firſt*, *Compared with my firſt Principle*, viz.

Ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἄνθρωποι ποιοῦσι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτάνουσι, διὸ ἀν ἀσεβεῖς, οἱ θεοὶ ἐποίησαν. *Plotin. Enn. l. 2. p. 263.*

Ἀνθαίρετα πάμαν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἡ πᾶς τλήμονες ἡ τάλανες ἢ ἑαυτῶν αἰρέσεσι γίνονται. *Hierocl. eis τὰ χρυσ. ἐπ. p. 258.*

Chap. III.

The ſecond Inference.

21. That *every* Reprobate is *predetermin'd* to *eternal puniſhment*, not by Gods *irreſpective*, but *conditional Decree*.

God

God does punish no man under the notion of a *Creature*, but under that of a *Malefactor*: and because he does not *create* a *malefactor*, but a *man*, he hateth nothing he hath *created*, but in as much as it hath *wilfully* (as it were) *uncreated* his *image* in it. So that no man is *sinfull*, because *ordain'd* to *condemnation*; but *ordain'd* to *condemnation*, because he is *sinful*. Sin is *foreseen*, and *punishment foreappointed*; but because that *sin* is the *cause* of *punishment*, and that the *cause* is not *after*, but *before* the *effect*, (in priority of *nature*, though not of *time*,) it followes that the *effect* cannot be *foreappointed*, until the *Cause* is *foreseen*. So that God *condemn's* no man by an *absolute decree*, (that is to say) *without respect*, or *intuition* of any *sin*; but the *præscience* of the *Guilt*, is the *motive* and *inducement* to the *determining* of the *Judgement*. And yet however my *second Inference* is depending upon my *first* by an *essential tye*, (which gives it the *force* and *intrinsick form of Demonstration*) yet because some *Readers* will assent much sooner, to a *plain Reason* lesse convincing, then to a more *convincing Reason* lesse plain, (and that some are wrought upon, by an argument *proportion'd* to their *Capacities*, or *Tempers*, rightly *level'd* and *adapted* more by *luckinesse*, then *design*, whilst another argument is *displeasing* they know not why, but that there is an *odnesse* in the *look* and *meen* which betokens some thing of *subtilty*, and makes them suspect there is a *serpent*, though they see not the *Ambush* in which it *lurks*) I will gratifie *such a Reader* by a proof of *this* too; first from *Scripture*, then from *Reason* (grounded upon *Scripture*) and last of all by an addition to my former suffrages of *Antiquity*: in which *S. Austin* more especially shall speak *as plainly*, and as *strongly* in my behalf, as any man

Explain'd.

that can be *brib'd* to be an *Advocate*, or a *witnesse*.

Proved by Scripture.

22. That my proof from *Scripture* may be the more effectual I shall first desire it may be consider'd; that since God is affirmed to have a *secret*, and a *reveal'd will*, we must not præposterously interpret what we *read* of his *reveal'd will*, by what we *conjecture* of his *secret* one: (for that were to go into the *dark*, to judge of those *Colours* which are seen only by the *light*) but we must either not *conjecture* at that which cannot be *known* (as Gods *secret* will cannot be, but by ceasing to be *secret*) or if we needs will be so *busie*, we must *guesse* at his *secret* will by what we *know* of his *reveal'd* one, that so at least we may *modestly* and *safely* erre. Upon which it followes: that we who meekly confesse we have not been of Gods *Councill*, must only judge of his *eternal and imperveſtigable Decrees*, by what we find in his *Word* concerning his *Promises* and his *Threats*: which are fitly call'd the *Transcripts*, *or Copies of his Decrees*. Such therefore as are his *Threats*, such must needs be his *Decrees*, (because the one cannot *prævaricate* or *evacuate* the other) but his *Threats* (as well as *Promises*) are all *conditional*, therefore his *decrees* must be so too.

Gen. 2. 17. Thus in his *Covenant* with *Adam* (and indeed the *word Covenant* doth evince what I am speaking) he *threatens* Death, or *decrees* it, (not with that peremptory Reason, which is the *redoubling* of the *will* only, *I will therefore, because I will*, but) on supposition of his *eating* the *forbidden* fruit. Which was not *therefore forbidden*, that *Adam* might *sin* in the *eating*; (*man* was not so *ensnared* by the *guide of his youth*) but *Adam sin'd* in the *eating*, because the Fruit had been *forbidden*. Such immediately

Chap 4. v. 7. after, was Gods language unto *Cain*. [*If thou* dost well, thou

thou shall be accepted, and *if thou* dost not well, sin lyeth at the door.) Again (saith *God* by the *mouth* of *Moses*) Behold, I set before you this Day a *Blessing* and a *Curse*. *A Blessing, if ye obey*; and *a Curse, if ye will not obey*. That is the form of making *Covenants* betwixt *God* and *man*, every where throughout the Scriptures and according to the *fulfilling* or *not fulfilling* of the *Condition*, the *Righteous Judge* of all the *world* proceeds to *sentence*. Which that we may not so much as *doubt* of, He (by a merciful *Anthropopathia*) is pleas'd to speak *like one of us*. *I will go down now and see, whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, and if not, I will know*. There is an expression of God to *Eli* (1 *Sam.* 30.) which shewes his will sometimes is either *not absolute*, or *not immutable*. *I said indeed that the House of thy Father should walk before me forever. But now the Lord saith, Be it far from me*. Which words do not argue any *fickleness* in his *Will*, but demonstrate his *Promise* to be *conditionall*: an [*If*] was *impli'd*, though not *expres'd*, and so it appears by the very next words. This is also the style that is us'd in the *New Testament*. *If thou shalt confesse with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt beleeve in thine heart, &c. thou shalt be saved*. From whence it followes, that *if* thou shalt *not* confesse with thy mouth, *nor* beleeve in thine heart, &c. *thou shalt be damn'd*. *If we forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses*. If *we suffer, we shall also reign; if we deny him, he also will deny us*. I will cast her into a bed, and them that commit fornication with her, into great tribulation, *except they repent* (Rev. 2. 22.) *If ye beleeve not that I am he*, ye shal dye *in your sins*, Joh. 8. 24. In a word, the very end of Christs coming into the world, was to *save us from*

Deut. 11. 16. 27.

Gen. 18. 21.

Rom. 10. 9.

Mat. 6. 15.

2 Tim. 2. 12. Rev. 2. 22. Joh. 8. 24. 2 Thes. 1. 7. 8. Mar. 16. 16.

Mat. 1. 21. Tit. 2. 14. *from our ſins,* (Mat. 1. 21,) *to redeem us from all iniquity.* (Tit. 2. 14.) He came to deliver us indeed out of the hand of our enemies, *but to the end that we might ſerve him in holineſſe and righteouſneſſe all the daies of our* Luk. 1. 74. 75. *lives.* (Luk. 1. 74. 75.) Now the *end* (we know) is the *prime condition,* the *greateſt requiſite* of all: which to neglect without repentance, is the *true Cauſe* of *condemnation*: for ſo runs the *ſentence* of our Saviour (Mat. 25. Mat. 25, 41. 42. 41.) *Depart from me ye curſed into everlaſting fire.* Why? for what *Reaſon?* He gives the *reaſon* in the next verſe, (not becauſe ye were *Reprobated* by an *abſolute decree*; not becauſe ye were *ordain'd* to be *veſſels of wrath* by a meer *irreſpective* and *inexorable will,* but) *becauſe I was hungry and ye gave me no meat, becauſe I was thirſty and ye gave me no drink.* (Which yet they could not have given him, if it had not been *given* them from above to *give.*) From which and a thouſand ſuch Texts beſides, I do thus ſtate the matter betwixt me and my ſelf. That none is *infinitely puniſht* by an *unavoidable neceſſity,* but for *not doing his duty*; nor becauſe he *cannot,* but *will not do it. Impoſſibility* is not a *ſin,* and therefore no man is *puniſht* for *not doing that,* which 'tis *impoſſible* for him Judg. 1. 7. *to do.* It was the cruelty of *Adonibezek,* to cut off mens Thumbs, and then to make it *their task* to *gather up meat under the Table.* A greater cruelty in *Pharaoh,* to require *a Tale of brick,* where he gave *no ſtraw.* Where- Rom. 2. 6. 11. as the *maſter* we *ſerve,* will *render to every man according* Gal. 6. 7. *to his works. With him there is no reſpect of perſons. But whatſoever a man ſoweth, that ſhall he reap.* And therefore let us not *ſin,* under pretence that all we do is by an *abſolute Decree*: (an *opinion* brought, amongſt *other Merchandiſe,* out of *Turkie* into *Chriſtendome,* and would be rooted

rooted out in the next *Reformation*) for every such sinner is his own *worst Satan, he seeks out death in the errour of his way, and puls upon himself Destruction with the works of his hands.* Wisd. 1. 12.

Other proofs out of Scripture, (and to some more convincing) will be found interweav'd in my following proofs.

33. I must next confirm this truth by *Reason*; and because this *Reason* will be *manifold*, I will make it my endeavour to be brief in *each*. Whereof the *first* shall be taken * from the *nature of punishment*, which (as before I signified) does præsuppose sin; sin does imply a *breach of Law*; and this again does imply, at once *a rational and a voluntary agent*. Which seems to me to be the Reason, why God is not offended with the *Cruelty of the Bear*, or with the *Pride* of the *Peacock*, or with the *Theevery* of the *Fox*. And why the *Earth* does not *sin* by breeding *Thornes and Thistles* against its *primitive Institution*. For the *ground* cannot be *punisht*, and was not *cursed* for its *own*, but for *Adam*'s sake only. (Gen. 3. 17. 18.) And lastly, this is the Reason, why the *Tower* of *Siloe* was not *Damn'd* for committing *murder*. *Man* is an *Agent* very capable of a *Law*, and so of *sin*, and so of *punishment*; and is *therefore* punisht, not because he *could not*, but because he *could* help it, by that *goodnesse of God* which would have *led him to repentance*, if he had not *despis'd the riches of his goodnesse*. Man is punisht because he *would* sin, and not because he *could not but sin*. *Proved secondly by Reason.*

* Note, Reader, that the *Execution* of God's Decree justly *answering* to his *Decree*, does shew the Reason of the *Reasons* which now Ensue; & is therefore noted in the Margin, because some have not conceived it, as implyed in the Text. Rom. 2. 4. 5.

24. My *second Reason* is taken from the *nature* of a *Covenant*; which ever implies a *Condition*: now when the *first Covenant* was broken, God *immediately* made a *second*

cond; not with *a part*, but with *all mankinde*. And this is observable in the *Title* of our *Gospel*; [ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη] which though we render the [*New Testament*] we might better render the (*New Covenant*) which cannot be without *Conditions*. *Heaven* and *Hell* are set before us; the performance of *Faith* and *Obedience*, is that important *condition*; without which, as the former will not be had, so cannot the latter be avoided.

25. My *third Reason* is taken from the *unlimited Generality* whereby *Promises and Threats*, *Rewards and Punishments*, *Exhortations and Dehortations*, are exhibited to * *all*. The *Gospel* is commanded to be *preached* unto *all*; and it is published in *writing*, that *all* might read and beleeve; *Baptisme*, *Repentance*, and *Remission* of sins are commanded to be *offer'd* to *all in general*, even to them that *refuse* both the *Word and the Preachers*. Who *when* they are refus'd (and not before) are *to shake the Dust off their feet for a Testimony against them*. Now *preachings* would be *vain*, and *exhortations* would be *deceitful*, if *life* and *death* did not *depend* upon *submitting* or *refusing* to be amended by them.

* Rev. 22. 17. Act. 17. 27. Mat. 28. 19. Luk. 24. 47. Joh. 20. 31. Luk. 9. 5.

26. My *fourth Reason* is taken from the *Degrees of Damnation*. Some shall be beaten with *many stripes*, and some with *fewer*; some shall have a *lesse*, and some a *greater Condemnation*. It shall be worse for *Chorazin* then for *Tyre*, worse for *Bethsaida* then for *Sidon*, worse for *Capernaum* then for *Sodom*, worse for the *Jewes* then for the *Ninevites*; which is not because one had a greater *Necessity* of sinning then the other, but one was guilty of the greater *Contempt*. Not because God had *absolutely Decreed a greater Punishment* to the one, but because the one had *means* of *sinning lesse* then the other. For our

Luk. 12. 47. Cap. 20. v. 47. Mat. 11. 20. 21. 23. 24. Mat. 10. 15.

our Saviour ſayes expreſly, that if the *mighty works* which were done in *Chorazin* and *Bethſaida*, had been alſo done in *Tyre* and *Sidon*, they would have *repented in Sackcloth and Aſhes*. Which was as much as to tell them, that it was not at all for want of *means and of mercy* on Gods part, but for want of *will* on *theirs*, that they did not *do* what was *commanded* to be *don*. And therefore our Saviour *did upbraid them, becauſe they repented not*, (Mat. 11. 20.) which he could not have don, had it been *impoſſible* for them to have repented. Our bleſſed Saviour was *too pitiful*, and of too *ſweet* a *diſpoſition*, to *jeer* a *poor Creature* for being *ſuch* as God *made* him, or for being ſuch as he *could not but be*, whether by *fatal*, or by *natural infirmity*. We eſteem it an *ill nature* to upbraid a *ſtammerer* for *not ſpeaking plain*; nor is any man *reproached* for being *naturally*, but *wilfully blind*; nor for being *born deaf*, but for being like *the Adder that ſtoppeth her ears*. He that *bindes* my *feet*, and then *invites* me to *come* to him, *intends* me nothing for *entertainment* but a *ſalted Sarcaſme*, or *bitter Jeſt*; for if he were *ſerious*, he would ſet my *feet* at *liberty*, that I might come in *good earneſt*; and not ſay to me, as we ſay to a Child that is *fallen down*, [*Come hither to me, and I will lift thee up.*] And yet this Mr. *Calvin* is fain to ſay, (having been firſt of all ingaged in that opinion) *That ſo many nations of men, together with their infants, were involved without remedy in eternal puniſhment, by the fall of Adam, for no imaginable reaſon, but that ſo it ſeemed good in the ſight of God*: and being pincht with that Text (Ezek. 18. 23.) *Have I any pleaſure at all that the wicked ſhould die, and not that he ſhould return from his waies and live?* he is fain to ſay, *That God wils not the Death of a ſinner, ſo far forth as he wils*

Joh. 3. 19. Pſal. 58. 4.

Calvinus in Inſtitut. l. 3. cap. 23. §. 7.

Mortem non vult Deus, in quantum vult pœnitentiam. Sed experientia docet, ita eam velle, ut cor peccatoris non tangat. Idem in Ezek. 18.

wils his Repentance. *Which experience teacheth us he doth so will, as not to touch his heart that he may repent.* Which is all one as to say, *he wils it* so as to *command it*; but he does *not will it so*, as to *leave it possible*: (that is) he wils it in *shew*, but not in *reality*. Nor do I know any way possible for Mr. *Calvin* to *escape* those *ugly sequels* unless by saying, [that the *sinner* may *repent* by the *strength* and *force* of *Nature*, without the *touch* of his heart by the *grace of God*,] which is to *shelter* himself under the *Heresie* of *Pelagius*. *Solomon* gives us a more *rationall accompt*, why *Wisdome* one day will *laugh* at mens *calamities*, and *mock* when their *fear cometh*; even because they *hated knowledge* and did *not choose the fear of the Lord*.

Prov. 1. 16. 29.

27. My *fifth Reason* is taken from the *nature* of *Death*, as that does signifie *Privation*, and as *Privation* supposes a former *Habit*. A stone is said to be *not alive*, because it suffers the *Negation of life*; but a stone cannot properly be said to be *dead*, because it doth not suffer the *Privation* of *life*. So that when a man is said in Scripture to be spiritually *dead* in Trespasses and Sins, he is imply'd by that expression to have been spiritually *alive*. And no man is damn'd for the *Negation*, but the *Privation of Grace*; because the *Negation of Grace* would *be Gods work*, whereas the *Privation* of it is his *own*. It having formerly been shew'd, That God doth not punish his *own work* in man, but man is punisht for his *own work*; not for *Gods illiberality*, but for *his own* being *a prodigal*; not because *no Talent* was *given* him, but because he *squander'd it away*. Sin is properly the *Death* of *Grace*; *Death* is a *privation*, a *privation* is of an *habit*. So that every sinner *had grace*, for this very Reason that he *hath lost* it; he *was alive*, for this very Reason that he is *dead*.

Luke. 19. 13. 20.

He

He came *alive* out of *Gods hands*, but he fals deſperately by his *own*. A man indeed may be *dead born*; but he cannot poſſibly be *dead begotten*; *deprived of life* he cannot be in the very Act of his *conception*. A man can no more be *created a ſinner*, then he can be *generated* a *dead man*: which infers the *Condition* of Gods *Decree*.

28. My *ſixth Reaſon* is taken from Chriſts having *bought* thoſe very men (2 Pet. 2. 1.) *whoſe damnation did not ſlumber*. (verſ. 3.) I have prov'd already, *Chriſt died for all that were dead in Adam*, from (2 Cor. 5. 14.) and from ſeveral other Texts. Which he could not be truly affirm'd to do, *had* any *one* been paſt by, by an *abſolute Præterition*. For that any man doth periſh for whom Chriſt dyed, is from his *own ſin*, and *not* from *Adams*, if to free us *from Adams* it was that *Chriſt died*. Which as it hath been already prov'd, ſo it may be confirm'd from other *Scriptures*: as from 1 Joh. 2. 2. where he is call'd *the propitiation, not for our ſins only, but alſo for the ſins of the whole world*. The Apoſtle *foreſees* and *confutes* the Hereſie of Chriſts dying *only for the Elect*, with a *not only, but alſo*. *He died for Infidels* and *impenitents*, as the whole ſtream of the *Fathers* conclude from thoſe words, *Deſtroy not him with thy meat for whom Chriſt died*. *And ſhall thy weak brother periſh for whom Chriſt died*? That this was the Judgement of the *primitive Church*, I can prove by an *Induction*, and though I now *ſpare* my *Reader*, yet I ſhall *trouble* him hereafter if *Challeng'd* to it. I ſhall at preſent refer him to the 31 *Article* of *our Church of England*. "[The *oblation of* "*Chriſt* once made is a *perfect Redemption, propitiation*, "and *ſatisfaction* for *all the ſins* of the *whole world*, as well

1 Joh. 2. 2.

Rom. 14. 15. 1 Cor. 8. 11.

Original

"*Original* as *Actual.*] I had almoſt forgot *a ſpecial* Teſtimony of *S. John*, who cals the *Meſſias* [*the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the World.*] So that if any man is in the *Dark*, it is not for *want of Light*, but becauſe he *will not ſee*, (as *S. Chryſoſtome* infers) which is the very interpretation that *S. John* himſelf gives it (chap. 3. verſ. 9.) *This* (ſayes he) *is the Condemnation, that light is come into the World, and men loved darkneſſe rather then light, becauſe their Deeds were evil.* Sure that which is the *Reaſon* of their *Condemnation*, was the *Condition* upon *which* they were *determin'd* to be *damn'd*: then which I know not what can be ſaid either *more plainly*, or *more convincingly* of *any ſubject* whatſoever.

Joh. 1. 9.

Cap. 3. v. 19.

29. My *ſeventh* Reaſon is taken from the *conditional Decrees of temporal Death, and other temporal puniſhments*; which are ſo *evidently Conditional*, as I cannot beleeve any Creature will deny it. The Denuntiations of *Deſtruction* to *Nineveh*, and of *certain death* to *Hezekiah*, do put this quite out of all *ſcruple*. For the firſt was *not deſtroy'd*, and the ſecond did *not die*, at that *determinate time* when God had threatned that they *ſhould*. Of which no reaſon can be given, but that Gods *Purpoſes*, and *Decrees*, and *Threats* were *conditional* on ſuppoſition of their *Impenitence* to *deſtroy*, and therefore on *ſight* of their *Repentance* he promis'd to preſerve. And from hence it is natural to argue thus. Is God *ſo merciful* to *bodies*? and is he *leſſe merciful* to *ſouls*? Does he decree *temporal Judgemeuts conditionally*, becauſe he is *pitiful*? and will he decree *Eternal ones abſolutely*, meerly *becauſe he will*? Is he ſo *unwilling* to inflict the *firſt death*, and will he ſhew his *power*, his *abſolute power* in the *ſecond*? Did he *ſpare* the *Ninevites* in *this life*, becauſe they were *penitents*?

Jonah. 3, 4, 10.
2 Kin. 20. 5.

penitents? and will he *damn* them in the *next*, because they were *Heathens*, by his *peremptory Decree*? Is he mild in *small things*, and *severe* in the *greatest*? Is there no other way to understand those Texts in *the 9. to the Romans*, then by making those Texts which sound *severely*, to clash against those that sound *compassionately*? Is it not a more *sober* and a more *reasonable Course*, to interpret *hard* and *doubtful* Texts by a far greater number more *clear and easie*, then perversly to interpret a *clear* Text by a *doubtful* one, or an *easie* text by one that's *difficult*? which is to *shew* the light by the *darkness*. Or if some Texts have *two senses*, if some are liable to *many more*, must we *needs* take them in the *worst*? and that in *meer contradiction* to the *universal Church*; If I had no other Argument against an *absolute* Reprobation, this one were sufficient to prevail with me, That *that Father of mercies* and *God of all consolation*, who *spareth* when we *deserve punishment*, did not *determine* us to *punishment without respect* to our *indeservings*. He that had mercy on wicked *Ahab* meerly because of his *Attrition*, did not *absolutely damn* him before he had don either *good* or *evil*, before the *foundations of the world were laid*. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children men*, (Lam. 3. 33.) much lesse doth he *damn* them for his *meer will and pleasure*. When God doth execute a *temporal punishment*, upon such as *already have deserv'd it*, he comes to it with *reluctation*, (ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ) and therefore cals it his * *strange work*, a work he loves not to be *acquainted with*, a work which he sometimes does execute, because he is *Just*; but still * *unwillingly*, because he is *compassionate*. And he therefore *so* expresses it, as we are wont to do a thing we are not *us'd to*, and know not *how to set about*,

1 Kin. 21. 29.

* Isa 28. 21.

* Lam 3. 33.

Hoſ. 11. 8. 9. about, [*How ſhall I give thee up, Ephraim? how ſhall I deliver thee, Iſrael? how ſhall I make thee as Admah? how ſhall I ſet thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turn'd within me, my Repentings are kindled together. I will not execute*
Exod. 32. 14. *the fierceneſſe of mine anger, I am God, and not man.*] Now that God doth profeſſe to *afflict unwillingly*, and many times *to repent him of the evil which he thought to do unto his people*, is a *demonſtrative* argument of his *Conditional decree*, in things *Temporal*, and, by a greater force of Reaſon, in things *Eternal*.

30. My *eighth* Reaſon is taken from the *little flock* which belongs to God, and the *mercy herd* which belongs to *Satan*. Which would not have been, if they had both been meaſur'd out by *a moſt abſolute Decree*. For when it pleas'd the *Divine goodneſſe* to ſuffer death upon the Croſſe for all the ſins of the world, (the *every drop* of whoſe bloud had been *ſufficiently precious* to have *purchaſed the Redemption* of *ten thouſand Adams*, and *ten thouſand worlds* of his *poſterity*) he would not yeeld the *major part* unto his impudent *Rival*, the *black prince of Darkneſſe*; reſerving to himſelf the far *leſſer portion*; and all this *irreſpectively*, meerly becauſe *he would*. He would not *abſolutely determine* ſuch a general *Harveſt* of *Wheat* and *Tares*, as freely to yeeld the Devil the *greater crop*. He would not ſuffer his *Juſtice* ſo to *triumph* over his *Mercy*, who loves
Jam. 2. 13. that *his Mercy ſhould rejoyce againſt Judgement*. It was not for want of a new *Inſtance*, to ſhew his *Power*, or his *Juſtice*; for they were *both* moſt eminent in the great *Myſterie of Redemption*. Much *greater Inſtances and Arguments*, then an *Abſolute Decree*; as I could *evidently* ſhew, if I were but ſure of my *Readers patience*.

My *ninth Reaſon* is taken from the Reprobation of *Angels*,

Angels, which was not irreſpective, but in regard to their Apoſtaſie, as is, and muſt be confeſſed, by all who place the object of Reprobation in *maſſâ corruptâ*. For the overthrowing of which Tenet (in all the *Sublapſarians*) Dr. *Twiſſe* himſelf does thus argue. *Si Deus non potuit Angelos reprobare, niſi ut contumaces, ergo nec homines niſi ut in contumaciâ perſeverantes.* De Prædeſt. Digreſ. 4. § 4. c. 2. 31. My *tenth Reaſon* is taken from the *Abſurdities* which *have*, and *ſtill muſt* follow, if Gods *eternall decree* of mans *miſery* is not *conditional*, but *abſolute*. And thoſe *abſurdities* are diſcernible, by this following *Dilemma*.

Let *Dives* be ſuppos'd to be the man that is Damn'd. It is either becauſe he *ſins*, or *meerly* becauſe *God will have it ſo*. If for the *firſt* Reaſon, [*becauſe he ſins*] then *ſin* is the *Cauſe* of his *Damnation* and conſequently *before it*. From whence it followes, that *Dives* is not *Damn'd* meerly becauſe God will *have it ſo*; but that God will *have it ſo*, becauſe he *ſins*. (Which plainly ſhew's the *Conditional Decree*.) But if it be ſaid that it is for the [*ſecond Reaſon, meerly becauſe God will have it ſo*] then that *abſolute Decree* to have it ſo, doth either *neceſſitate* him to *ſin damnably*, or it *does not*. Firſt, if it *does*, then how can *Dives* be guilty of that thing, of which Gods *abſolute Decree* is the *peremptory Cauſe*? Or how can that be *guilt*, which is *neceſſity*? (*Dives* could as little have cheriſht *Lazarus*, as the *Tower of Siloe* could have ſpar'd the *Galilæans*, had not his *will* been more *free*, then that *Tower* had a *will*.) And *ſecondly*, *if it does not* neceſſitate him to ſin damnably, then *Dives* who is *Damn'd* might poſſibly have *not been damn'd*. From whence it follows, That *Dives* is not Damn'd *abſolutely*, but in *regard* to his *ſins*. (Which

had they not been *his choiſe*, had not been *his*, but *his that choſe them*. And it is a *Contradiction*, to ſay, a man *chooſes* any thing, *without a free will*, or by an *abſolute neceſſity*, which is, *whether he will or no.*) Beſides; if God did *abſolutely decree* the *end*, which is *Damnation*, and conſequently the *means*, which is *final impenitence*; theſe Abſurdities would follow. *Firſt*, it would be a *Reprobates duty* to be *damn'd*. And to *endeavour* his *ſalvation* would be a *ſin*. Becauſe 'twere ſtriving *againſt the ſtream* of Gods *abſolute will*. If all men are to *chooſe*, and withall *to execute* the *will of God*, and that it is Gods *will* that the *greateſt part* ſhall be *damn'd*; it will then be a duty in the *greateſt part* of men, to *go induſtriouſly to Hell*. And to *do good* will be a *vice*, becauſe it tends *Heavenwards*, and ſo to the Croſſing of an *abſolute irreverſible Decree*. Which ſince I have conſider'd, I have leſſe wondred then I was wont, at the concluſion of *Carpocrates*, that *the very worſt of Actions are out of duty to be perform'd. And that the ſoul ſhall be puniſht with its impriſonment in the body, untill ſhe hath fill'd up the number of her iniquities*; according to that Text *Mat.* 5.29. Which we call *Iniquities*, but they *Duties*. And ſo indeed they would be, if every thing in the world (the *means* as well as the *end*) were *abſolutely ordain'd*, and by conſequence *effected* by God (bleſſed for ever) who can *ordain* nothing but *good*. And ſuch *ſin* and *Hell* muſt be [*exceeding good*] if they could poſſibly be *ordain'd* by as *abſolute a decree*, as the Heavens and the earth, the water, and the Air, of which God ſaid, *they are very good*. *Secondly*, Gods *Revealed will* being that *all ſhould* repent, and his *Secret will* being that very *few ſhall*; it followes thence, *That it is his will his will ſhould not be don.*

And

And that God hath *one will* which is the same with the *Devils*; and that when a *Reprobate* saies in the *Pater noster* [thy will be don] he vehemently *prayes* for his *own Damnation*. Which things, as they were falsly objected in *France* against *S. Austin*, so *Prospers* way to excuse him, was to make *protestations* against any such *Tenet*, as *unconditional Reprobation*. He sayes the very things in his *Masters vindication*, which I have said in my *own*. And cals the *sequels* of that *opinion* which he disowns, *most sottish blasphemies*, and not only *prodigious*, but *Devilish lies*. But he denies not at all, that such ill *consequences* will *follow*, upon the bold assertion of *irrespective reprobation*, which he does therefore very *distinctly*, and very *earnestly disclaim*. And he does so much speak the very *mind* of *S. Austin*, that he seems sometimes to speak out of his *mouth* too: it being hard to say, whether the *Answers to the Objections of Vincentius* do truly belong to the *Master*, or to the *Scholar*, they being inserted in *both their Works*. And that which is call'd *Prospers* by *Gerhard Vossius*, is ascrib'd to *S. Austin* by *Ludovicus Lucius*. If I have made any unfriendly or *injurious inference*, I will *instantly retract it* upon the least *conviction* that so it is. But truly the Reasons which I have given, have serv'd to confirm me in my adhærence to my *second Inference*. Which I yet farther prove by the *remaining votes of Antiquity*. For though my *former Citations* are all to this purpose, yet I will not *repeat* them, but add some others, (perhaps more *fully* and *indisputably*) to the number.

Ineptissimæ blasphemiæ. Prodigiosa mendacia. Diabolicus mendaciorum indiculus. Leguntur apud. Prosp. in Præfat. Respon. ad object. Vinc.

32. * And first I will set down the Confession of Mr. *Calvin*, *That the Schoolmen and Ancients are wont to say*, [*Gods Reprobation of the wicked, is in præscience of their wick-*

* *Proved thirdly by Antiquity. Solent veteres &c. & Scholastici in eâ acquiescunt &c. Non aliâ ratione quæ futura sunt, prævideat, nisi qui ita ut fierent decrevit.* Calvin. instit. l 3. c. 23. §. 6.

Nec abſurdum videri debet, Deũ nou modò primi hominis Caſum & in eo poſterorum ruinam prævidiſſe, ſed arbitrio quoq; ſuo diſpenſaſſe. Idem ibid. §. 7.

wickedneſſe] but he profeſſes to beleeve (with *one* more *modern*) *that God foreſaw all future things, by no other means, then becauſe he decreed they ſhould be made, or don. Nor ought it* (ſaith he) *to ſeem abſurd, That God did not only foreſee, but by his will appoint the fall of Adam, and in him of his poſterity. The Ancients*, he confeſſed, were quite of *another mind*, but becauſe he adds [*dubitanter*] and would have it thought that *S. Auſtin* was for his turn, I will ſet down ſome of *their* words, & begin with *Auſtins*.

33. No man is choſen unleſſe as differing from him that is rejected. Nor know I how it is ſaid [that God hath choſen us before the foundation of the world] unleſſe it be meant of his præſcience of faith and good works. ---*Jacob* was not choſen that he might be made good, but having been ſeen to be made good was capable of being choſen.

Nemo eligitur niſi jam diſtans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum eſt, [*quia elegit nos Deus ante mundi Conſtitutionem*] *non video quomodo ſit dictum, niſi de præſcientiâ Fidei & operum pietatis. & mox ---Jacobus non electus eſt ut fieret bonus, ſed bonus factus eligi potuit.* Auguſtin. ad Simplicianum l. 1. quæſt. 2.

If *S. Auſtin* was ſo diſtinctly for *Conditional Election* (and in thoſe very works too, which he afterwards writ as very ſufficient to confute *Pelagius*) he was infinitely *rather* for *Conditional Reprobation*. As any man knows that knows any thing of him; and may be ſeen in the ſame book to *Simplician*.

Noluit ergo Eſau, & non cucurrit. Sed & ſi voluiſſet, & cucurriſſet, Dei adjutorio perveniſſet, niſi vocatione contemptâ reprobus fieret. Id. in lib. ad Simpl.

Eſau would not, and did not run. For if he had, he had attain'd by the help of God; unleſſe he would be made a Reprobate by a contempt of his vocation.

It

It ſeems unjuſt, that without the merits of good or evil works, God ſhould love one, and hate another. *Num quid iniquitas eſt apud Deum?*

abſit. Iniquum enim videtur, ut ſine ullis bonorum malorumve operum meritis, unum Deus eligat, odiatq; alterum. Id. in Enchirid. cap. 98.

Wicked men had no neceſſity of periſhing from their not being elected; but they were therefore not elected, becauſe they were foreſeen to be wicked through their own wilful prevarication. *Non neceſſitatem pereundi habuerunt, quia prædeſtinati non ſunt; ſed ideo prædeſtinati non ſunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntariâ prævaricatione præſciti ſunt.* Proſper. ad Gallorum cap. 3. edit. Baſil. 1621.

God foreſaw that they would fall by their own proper will, and for that very reaſon did not ſeparate them by election from the ſons of perdition. *Illos ruituros propriâ ipſorum voluntate præſcivit, & ob hoc à filiis Perditionis nullâ prædeſtinatione diſcrevit.* Id ibid. ad cap. 7.

God is the creator of all men, but no man was created to the end that he might periſh. *Omnium quidem hominum Deus Creator eſt, ſed nemo ab eo ideo creatus eſt ut pereat.* Idem ad object. Vinc. 3.

34. I have given the more *Teſtimonies* out of *Proſper*, becauſe he is known to have been the *Scholar* and *vindicator* of S. *Auſtin*. And to produce *their ſuffrages*, is to imply all the reſt. They having been the *only Antients* whom their contentions againſt *Pelagianiſm* made to ſpeak ſometimes to the great diſadvantage of their opinion: as they do not ſtick to confeſſe themſelves. And we ought in all reaſon to take *that* for their *Judgement*, which we find deliver'd by themſelves by way of Apologie, and *vindication*. But though I need not, I will add ſome others.

He therefore brought the means of Recovery to all, that whoſoever periſht might impute it to himſelf who would not be cur'd, when he had a Remedy whereby he might. *Ideo omnibus operas ſanitatis detulit, ut quicunq; perierit, mortis ſuæ cauſam ſibi aſcribat, qui curari noluit, cùm remedium haberet quo poſſet evadere.* Ambroſ. l. 2. de Cain & Abel cap. 13.

Even

Etiam his qui mali sint futuri, datur potestas conversionis & pœnitentiæ. Hieron. l. 3. adversus Pelagianos.

Even they that shall be wicked have power given them of Conversion and Repentance.

Dilectio & odium Dei vel ex præscientiâ nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus. Idem, ad Malach. 1.

God's love and hatred arises from his præscience of things to come, or from the quality of mens works.

Si dies æqualiter nascitur omnibus, quanto magis Christus? —Cum singuli ad donarium vocentur, quid est ut quod à Deo æqualiter distribuitur, humanâ interpretatione minuatur? Cyprian. Epist. 76.

If the day is equally born for all, how much rather is Jesus Christ? --- When every man is call'd to a participation of the gift, what is the reason, that what God hath equally distributed should by humane interpretation by any way lessen'd?

* *Patet omnibus fons vitæ, neq; ab jure potandi quisquam prohibetur, aut pellitur.* Arnob. adversus Nat. l. 2.

* The fountain of life lies open to all. Nor is any man forbid or hindred from the right of Drinking.

Let Dr. *Twisse* himself be heard to speak in this matter, and that against *Piscator* (both *Antiarminians*) *Damnatio est Actus Judicis; & procedere debet secundum justitiam vindicativam: at ne vestigium quidem Justitiæ appareret in Damnatione Reproborum.* (He speaks of absolute irrespective Reprobation which *Piscator* set up) *Nam justitia neminem damnat nisi merentem. At esse reprobum, nequaquam significat mereri Damnationem. Sola Damnatio peccatoris splendere facit Dei Justitiam.* Twissus in vind. Gr. de Præd. l. 1. Digr. 1. §. 4. p. 57.

35. *Time* and *paper* will fail *me*, and *sufficient Patience* would fail my *Reader*, if I should make repetition of all I finde to my purpose. For whatsoever hath been spoken by the *Fathers*, of *universal Redemption*, doth Diametrically oppose the *irrespective Reprobation*. And to reckon up their *verdicts* in that behalf, were to ingage my

my *self* and *Reader* in a new *Ocean* of *employment*. I hope the account that I have given of my *belief* in this matter is a sufficient *Apologie* for my *belief*, and may at least *excuse* if not *commend* me. Rather then offend any man who takes me *upon Trust* to be *unsound* in my *principles*, I have made this *excuse* for being *orthodox*, and do humbly desire to be *forgiven*, if I still adhære to *that Doctrine*, which by *Scripture*, and *Reason*, and the Authority of my *Teachers*, I am verily perswaded is the *truest* and the most *safe*: (to wit,)

The sum of all that hath been said.

1. That *man* himself is the *Cause* of his *sin*.
2. That *sin* is properly the *Cause* of its *punishment*.

And by consequence,

3. That *man* is the *procurer* of his own Misery.

And by consequence,

4. That *Reprobation* is a *Conditional* thing.

Not decreed by God Almighty to shew his *absolute power*, but to shew his *power* in the *exercise* of his *Justice*. Not Determin'd *before*, but *because* of his præscience. Nor *without regard or respect*, but in *Relation to sin, in foresight*, and *hatred*, and *Recompence* of it, as of an *injury*; on which *Damnation* is *prædain'd*, by way of *Recompence* and *Revenge*. And therefore the last day is call'd a *day of Judgement*, as well as of *perdition*. And the Judge himself is called, the *Lord God of Recompence*. And when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed in flaming fire, it shall be to take *vengeance* on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Now that which is *the motive* to the *taking of vengeance*, was also the *motive* to the *making of the Decree*. He who *therefore takes vengeance, because they obey not the Gospel of Christ*, did for the very same *Reason, Decree to take it*.

2 Pet. 3. 7. Jer. 51. 56. 2 Thess. 1. 8.

Which

An obvious expedient to reconcile dissenters.

Which to me is *Demonstration* that the *Decree* is *Conditional*.

36. I have nothing now of *Duty* that lies upon me to be don, but that I descend to the *second ground* of my *Belief*. But for the love of *Charity* and *Reconcilement*, I will endevour to take a Course of making some *Composition* with my *Dissenters*. If they will but come up to my most *Reasonable Demands*, we will not strive about *words* and *phrases*; so small a thing shall *never part us*. I will *swallow* the word [*Necessity*,] so I may take it down with a *grain of salt*. I will say with Dr. *Whitaker* (in his 4. *Article* at *Lambeth*) *That they who are not prædestin'd to salvation shall be necessarily Damn'd* (but) *for their sins*. (as he himself speaks.) I allow my self to be *no wiser* then *Bishop Andrews*, (the *strings* of whose *books* I am not worthy to *untie*) who interprets *Necessariò*, not by an *absolute Necessity*, but by a *Necessity which follwes sin*. They shall be damn'd *for their sins*; that is, *for that very Reason, because they have sin'd*, not for that *only* Reason, *because they are not prædestin'd*. And because that *Reverend*, (I know not whether more *learned*, or *Saint like*) *Man*, allow'd himself to be no wiser then all the *Fathers and Schoolmen* who went before him, he thought 'twas fit to abstain from [such καινοφωνίαι] such *new phrases*, and waies, of *holding forth*, and *making out*, the *Ancient Doctrines* of the Church; and therefore in stead of [*necessity*] to say [*without Doubt.*] And for my own part, I desire to be *no deeper*, and to speak *no better language*, then all the *Fathers of the Church* (who have gon to *Heaven* with those *opinions*, for which I am *Censur'd* by *some* to *Hell*,) I choose to say [a *Conditional*, not an *absolute Necessity*.]

Qui non sunt prædestinati ad salutem, necessario propter peccata condemnabuntur. Art. Lamb. 4.

Atq; id necessariò (*si sic loqui placeat*) *sed* necessitate ex hypothesi, non Absolutâ. *Id est, ideo* quia peccarunt, *non autem* ideo, *quia non sunt prædestinati.* Epist. Wint. Jud. de art. Lamb.

37. I

37. If I may gueſſe (without cenſure) at the *Cauſe* of other mens *miſtakes*, by that which once was mine *own*, I ſhall aſcribe much of it to the vulgar *miſconception* of Gods *præſcience* or *foreſight*. Which being *conſtant* and *infallible*, ſeems to give a *neceſſity* to all *events*, which are the objects of that *præſcience*. And this muſt certainly be the reaſon, (I at leaſt *muſt ſo conjecture* who can think of no *better*, and did my ſelf *once ſtumble* upon this very *ſtone*) why Mr. *Calvin* will have Gods *præſcience* to ſucceed his *præordination*. The *ground* of which *error* does ſo border upon *Truth*, as to leſſen the wonder why men of *good parts* ſhould ſo frequently *miſtake* it, for that very truth, on which it *borders*. (And does unluckily verefie the *Italian Proverb*, *Troppo confina la vertù col vitio.*) Gods *præſcience* indeed does *imply* a *neceſſity*, which 'tis miſtaken to have *effected*. And again the word *neceſſity* is not by every body *diſtinguiſht*, as by the *Admirable Boethius*: (to whom I owe my greateſt *light* in this particular.) For if it were, I beleeve many others might be *converted*, as I have *been*. But before I ſpeak of the *Diſtinction*, I ſhall chooſe to ſay ſomething in *preparation* to it. 'Tis briefly this.

The probable cauſe of the Diſſention is a miſtake of Gods præſcience.

38. That the *knowledge* of the *Eternal* far tranſcending all *motion* and ſucceſſion of *time*, does abide in the *ſimplicity* of its *preſent* being; beholding all *paſt* and *future* things in his *ſimple knowledge*, as *juſt now* done. And therefore *Boethius* will have it call'd not *Præſcience*, but *Science*. Not *Prævidence*, but *Providence*: which doth not change the *natures* and *proprieties* of things *future*, but conſiders them as they *are*, in *reſpect of himſelf*; which is as they *ſhall be*, in *reſpect of Time*. For as the *knowledge* of things *preſent* doth import no *Neceſſity*

The miſtake endeavour'd to be rectified.

Iſ. 41.22.23. Act. 15.18. Pſ. 139.2.

Boethius de conſol. Philoſoph. lib. 5.

on that which *is done*; so the *fore knowledge* of *things future* layes no *necessity* on that which *shall be*: because whosoever either *knowes* or *sees* things, he *knows* and sees them as *they are*, and not as they *are not*. Gods knowledge doth not *confound* things, but reaches to all *events*, not only *Which* come to passe, but as they come to passe: whether *contingently*, or *necessarily*. As (for illustration) when I see a *man walk* upon the *earth*, and at the very same instant, the *Sun shining* in the *Heavens*, I see the first as *voluntary*, and the second as *natural*. And though at the instant that I see *both done*, there is a *necessity* that they *be done* (or else I could not see them when I do) yet there was a necessity of *one only*, before they were done, (viz. the *Suns shining in the Heavens*) but none at all of the *other*, (viz. the *mans walking upon the earth*.) The Sun could not *but shine*, as being a *natural agent*; The man might *not have walked*, as being a *voluntary* one. And hence it followes.

By the consideration of a twofold necessity in events.

39. There is a *twofold necessity*. Whereof one is absolute and the other on *Supposition*. The *Absolute* is that, by which a thing *must* be *moved* when something *moves it*. The *Suppositive* is that, by which a man shall be *damn'd* if he die *Impenitent*. The *latter necessity* (though not the *first*) does mightily well consist both with the *liberty of man's will*, and God's *Conditionall Decrees*. As for example. I am *now writing*, and God foresaw that I am writing, yet it does not follow that I *must needs write*; for I can choose. What God foresees *must necessarily* come to passe, but it must come to passe *in the same manner that he foresees it*. He foresees I will write, not of *necessity*, but *choice*; so that his *foresight* doth not *make* an *absolute Necessity*, but *infers a Necessity* upon *Supposition*. (Wee must

Duæ sunt necessitates. Simplex una, veluti quòd necesse est omnes homines esse mortales. Altera conditionis, ut si aliquem ambulare sciam, cum ambulare necesse est. Boeth. de con. Phil. l. 5.

muſt mark, in a *Parentheſis*, how great a difference there is, betwixt the *making*, and the *inferring* of a Neceſſity.) Whatſoever I do, there is an *Abſolute* Neceſſity that God ſhould *foreſee*; yet God foreſeeing my *voluntary Action*, does not make it *neceſſary*, but on *ſuppoſition* that it is *don*. If all things are *preſent* to God, (as indeed they are) *his foreſight* muſt needs be all one with *our ſight*. As therefore when I ſee a man *daunce as he pleaſes*, it is *neceſſary* that he *do* what I *ſee* he *does*; but yet my *looking on* does not *make* the thing *neceſſary*; So Gods *foreſeeing* that man *would ſin*, implyed a *certainty* that ſo it would be, but did not make it an *abſolutely neceſſary* or *involuntary* thing. For that a thing may be *certain* (in reſpect of its *event*) and yet *not neceſſary* (in reſpect of its *cauſe*) is no newes at all to a conſidering perſon, who will but duly diſtinguiſh Gods *Omniſcience* from his *Omnipotence*, and his *Foreſight* from his *Decree*, and *infallible* from *neceſſary*, and *ſpontaneous* from *voluntary*, and that which *follow's* as a *Conſequence only*, from that which *follow's* as a *conſequent*. If I may judge by thoſe *errors* which I convince my ſelf to have been in, when I was contrary minded to what I am, I ſee as many *miſtakes* in other men ariſing from the *misfortune* of *confounding* thoſe things which I juſt now *diſtinguiſht*, as from any one *unhappineſſe* that I can think of. And from all that I have ſpoken upon this laſt ſubject, it ſeems inevitably to follow, that a *ſuppoſitive Neceſſity*, and *none elſe*, is conſiſtent with a *free and contingent Action*. Whilſt *I ſee* a man *ſitting*, it is *neceſſary* that he *ſit*, but upon *ſuppoſition* that *I ſee* him *ſitting*. His *poſture* is ſtill a voluntary *contingent* thing. For he *ſate down* when he *would*, and may *ariſe* when he *pleaſeth*. (but ſtill with a *proviſo*

Eccles. 15. 14.

of God's *Permiſſion.*) I deſire to be taught what *it*, if this is not, *exact ſpeaking*, viz. That God by his *prohibition* under *penalty*, makes my *Diſobedience* become liable to *puniſhment*. And by his *Decree* to *permit*, or *not hinder* me, he *leaves me in the hand of mine own counſel*, and ſo in the ſtate of *peccability*, that I may *ſin*, and *periſh*, if *I will*. So that by his *præſcience* that *I will ſin*, he hath no manner of *influence* or *cauſality* upon my *ſin*; which inferrs my *deſtruction* to be entirely from *my ſelf*. Iam a little confident, that whoſoever ſhall but read *Boethius* his *fifth book*, and reading ſhall *underſtand* it, and underſtanding ſhall have the *modeſty* to *retract* an *error*, he will not reverence the 4. *Section* of the 23. *Chapter* of the 3. *book* of *Inſtitutions*, becauſe it is Mr. *Calvins*, but will *ſuſpect* Mr. *Calvin* becauſe of that *Section*. The Queſtion there is, [*Whether Reprobates were prædeſtin'd to that corruption which is the cauſe of Damnation*] To which he anſwers with a [*Fateor*] *I confeſſe that all the ſons of Adam; by the expreſſe will of God, fell down into the miſery of that condition, in which they are fetter'd and intangled.* And a little after he profeſſeth, that no accompt can be given, but by *having recourſe to the ſole will of God*, the *cauſe of which lies hidden within it ſelf*. And that we may not think he ſpeaks only of the *poſterity* of *Adam*, he tells us plainly in the *cloſe* of that *Section*, *that no other cauſe can be given for the defection of Angels*, then that God did *reprobate* and *reject* them. In this place I would aske, Was the Angels *Defection* or *Apoſtaſie* their *ſin*, or *not*? if *not*, why were they *reprobated* and *caſt* into *chaines* of *darkneſſe*? and if it were, how then is *God's Reprobation* not only the *chief*, but the *only Cauſe* of *ſuch a ſin*? This is the *ſad effect* of being *enſlaved* to an *opinion*, and of being *aſham'd* of that

that liberty which looks like *being conquer'd*. I beleeve the *love of victory* hath been the cauſe of as many *miſchiefs*, as have been feign'd to leap forth from *Pandora's Box*. Whereas if every one that *writes*, would but think it a noble and an *honourable* thing, to *lead* his own *pride captive*, to triumph over his own *conceitedneſſe*, and to purſue the *glory* of a *well natur'd ſubmiſſion*; there is perhaps hardly an *Author* of any conſiderable *length*, but might think he had reaſon to write a *book* of *Retractations*. And ſure it will not be immodeſty for a *young* man to ſay, That many *old men* might have don it, with as much reaſon as *S. Auſtin*. 40. But as I have learnt of *Boethius* (that moſt excellent *Chriſtian*, as well as *Senator*; & *profound Divine*, as well as *philoſopher*; who lived a *Terror* to *Hereſie*, and died a *Martyr* for the *Truth*) to diſtinguiſh of *Neceſſity*; ſo have I learn't from other *Antients*, to diſtinguiſh better of God's *will*, then I was wont to do. Firſt, I diſtinguiſh (with *S. Chryſoſtome*) of a *firſt* and *ſecond* will. Gods *firſt will* is, that *the ſinner ſhould not die*, but *return rather from hts wickedneſſe* and *live*. His *ſecond will* is, that he who *refuſeth to return* receive the *wages of iniquity*. Secondly, I diſtinguiſh (with *Damaſcene*) of an *antecedent* and a *conſequent will*. The *antecedent* is that, by which he wils that *every ſinner ſhould repent*. His *conſequent* is that, by which he *preordaineth* the *Damnation* of the *impenitent*. Which diſtinction is not made in reſpect of *Gods will ſimply* (in which there cannot be either *prius* or *poſterius*) but in reſpect of the things which are the *object* of his *will*. For every thing is *will'd* by God ſo far forth as it is *good*. Now a thing *conſider'd abſolutely* may be *good* or *evill*, which in a *comparative conſideration* may be the contrary as for example. *To ſave the life of a man*, is

And by a right Application of a twofold Will in the Almighty.

Chryſoſt. in Epiſt. ad Eph. c. 1. Homil. 1.

Damaſcen. l. 2. Orth. Fid. c. 29.

is *good*; and to *deſtroy a man*, is *evil*, in a *firſt* and *abſolute conſideration*. But if a man ſecondly be *compar'd* with his having been a *murderer*, then to *ſave* his life, is *evil*; and to *deſtroy* it, *good*. From whence it may be ſaid of a *juſt* Judge, that by his *antecedent will*, he *deſires* every man ſhould *live*; but by a *conſequent will*, *decrees* the *death* of the *Murderer*. And even then, he doth ſo diſtinguiſh the *murderer* from the *man*, that he wiſheth the *man* were *not a murderer*. Whom he condemns as *murderer*, and not as *man*. For whilſt he hath a *will* to *hang* the *murderer*, he hath a merciful *woulding* to *ſave* the *man*. He doth not *hang* the *man*, but only becauſe he is a *murderer*. And (if it lay in his power) he would *deſtroy* the *murderer*, to *ſave* the *man*. Both the one, and the other, is not an *abſolute*, but a *conditional will*. He *would* ſave the man, (with an) [if] he were not a murderer. And *doth deſtroy* the *murderer*, (with a) *becauſe* he is a *Malefactor*. Juſt ſo, God's *antecedent will* is, that every man *would repent* that he may *not periſh*. It is his *conſequent will*, that every one may *periſh* who will *not repent*. Both the one and the other is *reſpective* and *conditional*. Thirdly, I diſtinguiſh (with *Proſper*) of an *inviting*, and *revenging will*. The *inviting* will is that, by which *all* are bidden to the *Wedding Feaſt*; his *revenging* will is that, by which he puniſheth thoſe that *will not come*. Or fourthly, I diſtinguiſh (with reverend *Anſelme*) of the *will* of *God's mercy*, and of the *will* of his *Juſtice*. It is the *will* of his *Mercy*, that Chriſt ſhould die for the ſins of all; but 'tis the *will* of his *Juſtice*, that *all* ſhould periſh who *come not in* when they are *call'd*, or who only *ſo* come, as not to *continue*, and *perſevere unto the end*.

Proſper. in Reſpon. ad objec. Vincen. ſub finem.

Anſelmus in Mat. cap. 6.

41. All

41. All these *Distinctions* come to *one* and the *same purpose*, and being *rightly understood*, as well as *dexterously used*, do seem to me a *Gladius Delphicus*, sufficient to *cut asunder* the chiefest *knots* in this Question. For the *first* will of God may be *repealed*, whereas the *second immutable*. Which is the ground of that Distinction betwixt the *Threats* and *Promises* under God's *Oath*, and those other under his *Word* only. Of which saith the *Councel* of *Toledo*, *Jurare Dei est, à seipso ordinata, nullatenus convellere. Pœnitere verò, eadem ordinata, cùm voluerit, immutare.* *When* he is resolv'd to *execute* his *purpose*, he is said to *swear*; and when it *pleaseth* him to *alter it*, he is said to *repent*. For there are some Decrees of God which (being conditional) do *never come to passe*; as he *thought* to have done an *Evil of punishment* unto Israel, which yet he *did not*. *Exod.* 32. 14. And the reason of this is given us from that *distinction* before mention'd. Which also serveth to *reconcile* many *seeming repugnances* in *Scripture*. For when it is said, that *God repenteth* (1 *Sam.* 16. 29.) it is meant of the *first will*; and when it is said *he cannot repent* (1 *Sam.* 16. 29,) it is meant of the *second*. In respect of the *first*, we are said to *grieve*, to *quench*, to *resist* the *Spirit* of God, (1 *Thes.* 5. 19.) but when it is said, *who hath resisted his will?* (*Rom.* 9. 19.) it is meant of the *second*. God's *Mercy* is *above* and *before* his *Justice*, and therefore that is his *first will*, that *all should be sav'd and come to the knowledge of the Truth* (1 *Tim.* 2. 4.) but yet so as that *Justice* is not *excluded* by his *Mercy*, and therefore that is his *second Will*, that *so many should be damn'd as hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord.* (*Prov.* 1. 29.) The will of his *Mercy*, *that all should*

Concil. Tolet. 8. c. 1.

ſhould live, is from nothing but his *goodneſſe*; whereas the will of his *Juſtice*, *that ſome ſhould die*, *depends* upon ſomething in the *Creature*. (So that *both parties* may be gratified, they that are for the *dependence*, and *the independency* of his *Will*.) That the Reprobate is *invited*, is from the *mercy* of God's Will; but that he is *puniſh'd* for *not accepting*, is from the *obliquity* of his *own*. In reſpect of the *firſt*, it *is the man* that *refuſeth* God (Jer. 8. 5.) But in reſpect of the *ſecond*, it is God that doth *reprobate man*. (*Rom.* 1. 28.) The *free Love* of the *Creator* is the *only motive* to his *firſt will*; but man's *ingratitude* and *rebellion* is his *impellent* to the *ſecond*. The *firſt* ſhewes him a *tender* and *compaßionate Father*; the *ſecond* ſpeaks him a *righteous* and an *impartial Judge*. *Both* proclaim him a *powerful and a provident God*. Now can any *Diſtinction* be better *choſen*, can any *word* that is *æquivocal* be more *ſafely underſtood*, can any *Opinion* (of God's will, or *mans*) be more *rationally*, more *warily*, or more *religiouſly* entertain'd, then *that* wherein God's *Mercy* doth *greet* his *Juſtice*? and wherein his *Love* doth *kiſſe* his *Power*? I *appeal* to any man living, whether this be an *Error*, or if it is, whether it is not a very *ſafe one*; and if it is ſo, whether it is not a very *ſmall* one; and if ſo *ſafe*, that none can *ſuffer* by it; if ſo *ſmall*, that no body can *ſee it*; whether the *Author* of this *Appeal* is not very *excuſable*, both for not being able to *ſee* his *own Eyes*, nor to *ſee* his *own Error* with other *mens*. As much as in me lies, *I would live peaceably with all men*. With thoſe eſpecially, who *when I ſpeak unto them thereof*, *make them ready to battle*. And in order to that *Peace*, I deſire them to lay this one thing to heart. That as, if I were as *they*, I would *quit my Opinion*; ſo, if *they* were as I, they would not long *keep their own*.

Rom. 12.18.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Free and ſpecial Grace defended againſt the Pelagians and Maſſilians in the ſecond Principle propoſed.

42. HAving proved hitherto, that *Sin* is really the *cauſe* of *Puniſhment*, that *Man* is really the *cauſe* of *Sin*, and therefore that *Man* is the *grand cauſe* of *Puniſhment*, (as being the *cauſe* of the *cauſe* of his *Damnation*) intending thereby to *ſecure* my ſelf againſt the errors and blacker guilt of the *Manichees*, the *Marcionites*, the *Stoicks*, and the *Turks*, who do all affirm (ſome *directly*, ſome by *neceſſary conſequence*) That *God's abſolute Will* is the *cauſe* of *ſin*, and *man's* only the *inſtrument*; the *ſecond part* of my *Task* is to be an *Advocate*, for the *pleading* and aſſerting the *Cauſe* of *God* too; and that againſt the *Opiners* of the *other Extreme*, to wit, the *Pelagians* and the *Maſſilienſes*; who, to be *liberal* to *Nature*, do *take away* from *Grace*; and to *ſtrengthen* the *Handmaid*, do *leſſen* the *forces* of the *Miſtreſſe*. And though I think the *latter* to be the *milder Hereſie* of the *two*, it being *leſſe dangerous* to aſcribe *too much goodneſſe* to the *Power* of *Nature*, (which very power is undoubtedly the gift of God) then the very *leaſt Evil* to the *God of all Grace*, (and this according to the Judgement of the *Synod* at *Orange*, which pronounced an *Anathema* upon the firſt *Hereſie*, whereas it did but *civilly reject* the *ſecond*) yet in a *perfect diſlike* and *rejection* of this latter *Extremity*, as well as of the former, my *ſecond Principle* is this,

The second Principle or Ground of my Belief in this businesse.

That *all* the *good* which I *do*, I do first *receive*; not from any thing in *my self*, but from the *special Grace* and *Favour* of *Almighty God*. Who freely *worketh in me*, both to *will*, and to *do*, of his *good pleasure*, Phil. 2. 13.

Explained.

43. That I may not be suspected of any *secret Reservation* within my self, in the laying down of this *Principle*; I will endevour to *speak out*, and make my *Reader* my *Confessor*, by revealing the very *utmost* of what I think in *this businesse*. *I believe*, that *no man* can come to *Heaven*, any otherwise then by *Christ*; nor to *Christ*, unless it be *given*; (that is, unless the *Father draw him.*) First the *Father* loves the *Son*; next he loves *us in* the *Son*; then *endowes* us with his *Spirit*; so endow'd he *elects* us; *so elected* he *prædestines* us; so *prædestin'd* he will *glorifie* us; by *crowning* his *Gifts* and *Graces in* us. I say *his Graces*, because they are not *acquir'd* by *us*, but *infus'd* by *him*. Nor so properly *given*, as *lent* us. Lent us as *Talents*, not to *hide*, but *multiply*. Wee owe it wholly to God, not that he gives us his *Grace* only, but that he gives us the *grace* to *desire* his *Grace*, as well as to use it to the advancement of his Glory. And we are to *thank* him, as for all other mercies, so for this also, *even that we have the Grace to thank him*. So far am I from that *Pelagianism* whereof I have *wrongfully* been *accus'd*, (I beseech God not *to lay it to my Accusers charge*) that I have never lain under any the least *Temptation* to any *degree* of that *Heresie*. No, no more, then *Fulgentius*, or *Prosper*, or *S. Austin himself*. It not only *is*, but *ever hath been* my *assertion*, That as we cannot *spiritually* be *nourished*, unless the *Father of Mercies* doth *reach out unto us the Bread of Heaven*; and as we cannot *take*

Act. 4. 12. Joh. 6. 44. 65.

take it when it is *offered*, unleſſe he *gives* us the *hand* of *Faith*; ſo cannot we poſſibly *deſire* to take it, unleſſe he gives us our very *appetite* and *hunger*. We cannot *pant* after the *waters of life*, unleſſe he gives us our very *thirſt*. He *ſtirs us up*, when we are *ſleeping*, that we may *ſeek him*; and *ſhews* himſelf, when we are *ſeeking*, that we may *find him*; and gives us *ſtrength*, when we have *found* him, that we may *hold him faſt unto the end*. There is no *good thought* ariſing in us, unleſſe ſuggeſted by his (a) *preventing* Grace. No, nor *increaſing*, unleſſe *ſtrengthned* by his (b) *ſubſequent* Grace. No nor *conſummate*, unleſſe (c) *perfected* by his Grace of *perſeverance*. If I am *better* then *any man*, it is God that *makes* me (d) *differ*. *Every good gift is from above, and cometh down from the father of lights.* And therefore *he that will glory, let him glory in the Lord*, ſaying with the Pſalmiſt, *Not unto us O lord, not unto us, but unto thy name give the praiſe.*

44. Having thus *ſecur'd* my ſelf from giving the *Will* of *Man* a *ſacrilegious Liberty*; I muſt with all provide, that I be able to *anſwer* the *Objection* of the *Marcionites*; which *Tertullian* could not do, but by *aſſerting* the *liberty* of the *Will*. Which *Grace* doth *correct*, but not *deſtroy*. Grace doth *ſtrengthen*, but not *compell*. Grace doth *guide*, but not *neceſſitate*. Grace *makes able* to *chooſe good*, but not *unable* to *refuſe it*. *Marcion* objected thus. *If* God *is good, and præſcient of all the Evill which is to come, and withal able to prevent it, why did he ſuffer mankind to fall?* why did he not *hold him faſt* by *irreſiſtible* Grace? *Tertullian* anſwer'd, *That God made man in his own Image*, and that in nothing more *lively* then in the *liberty of a Will*. *And to that it is, to which his fall muſt*

a Phil. 1. 6. & 2. 13. Heb. 12. 2. *b* Luke 19. 13. 26. *c* 1 Cor. 15. 10. *d* 1 Cor. 4. 7. Jam. 1. 17. 1 Cor. 1. 31. Pſal. 115. 1. *Reconciled with Choice*, which is *irreconcilable* with *Irreſiſtibility*. *Object.* 1. *Si Deus bonus & præſcius mali, & potens depellere, cur hominem labi paſſus eſt? Reſp. liberum & ſui arbitrii & ſuæ poteſtatis invenio hominem.* & ſeqq.

Object. 2. Homo ita debuit institui, ut non posset cadere. Resp. Ergo bonum suum haberet emancipatum sibi à Deo. Et bonus aut malus necessitate fuisset inventus, non voluntate Nec boni nec mali merces jure pensaretur ei. Tertull. adverſ. Marc. l. 2. c. 5. 6. 1. *Proved by Scripture.* Phil. 2. 12, 13.

be imputed. But (ſaith *Marcion*) *Man ought* to have been made of *ſuch a frame*, as *not to be able to fall away.* Yea but then (ſaith *Tertullian*) *Man* had not been a *voluntary*, but a *neceſſary Agent.* (which is as much as to ſay, *a Man ſhould not have been a Man.*) *Nor could have been a right object of Reward and Puniſhment.*

45. Before I venture on any *rational*, or *Scholaſtical* way of *arguing*, I muſt firſt *enlighten* my ſelf out of ſome *clear* places of *Scripture.* Amongſt which there is none that ſeems more proper, then that of *S. Paul* to the *Philippians. Work out your ſalvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you, both to will, and to do, of his good pleaſure.* He bids *them work, becauſe God worketh*, which they needed not to have been bid to do, If God had *wrought* after a *phyſical irreſiſtible* manner. That they might not be betray'd into a *yawning reliance* upon their being *ſuperacted* to the *working out* of their *ſalvation*, he bids them work it out with *fear and trembling.* (as our Saviour bids us, *Strive to enter in at the ſtrait Gate*, becauſe *many ſhall ſtrive*, and *ſhall not enter.*) which they needed not have don, had their ſalvation been (not only a *certain*, but withall) *a neceſſary, unavoidable thing*, and ſo inconſiſtent with *choice* and *option.* But the Apoſtle tels them (in the *next verſe*) that it is *God* who worketh in them, not *only to do*, but to *will*, and to *do*; by his *preventing Grace*, he worketh in them to *will*; by *aſſiſting Grace*, he worketh in them *to do*: by neither ſo *irreſiſtibly*, but that they muſt *work it out Themſelves too*; and that not only with *expectation* and *hope*, but with *fear* and *trembling.* God *worketh in us* to *will* (ſaith the *Apoſtle*) not *without*, or *againſt*, but *according to* the *nature* of that very *will* with which he *made us.* *Grace* doth not

not *destroy*, but *establish*, and *strengthen*, and *perfect Nature*. Shall we say that we do a thing *without liberty* and *choice*, because God *worketh in us* to *will* and *to do*? (that is) to do it by *choice* and *option*? is the liberty *lost*, because it is *guided* and *enabled* to do that which is good? if I *can do all things through Christ that strengthens me*, then can I (*through him*) both *refuse* the *evil*, and *choose* the *Good*. Which would not be *choice*, if it were *whether I would or no*. And so it would be, were I *unable* to *resist it*. (as I shall shew by and by in the open confession of D. *Twisse*, whose *Favourers* cannot be angry with one that speaks in his language.) *I can do all things through him that strengthens me*, (saith the *Apostle*) now *to strengthen*, is not to *necessitate*. For then *to strengthen*, would be *to weaken*. Because to *necessitate*, or *compel*, with an *irresistibility*, is to *vanquish*, and *over-master*; not to *give strength*, but rather to *take it away*. Again, our Saviour is said *to tread down Satan under our feet*. To what end doth he *tread* the *Serpent down*, but that we may have the *freedom* to *trample on him*? and though he doth it *with his own feet*, yet it is *under ours*. This *liberty* and *freedom* of the *regenerate will*, is at once *expressed* and *expounded* in those words of the *Psalmist*, *I will run the way of thy Commandments, when thou shalt set my heart at liberty*. To which is agreeable that of our *Saviour*, *and the truth shall make it free*. It being a great *absurdity* (in the opinion of *Tertullian*) *that a man should have his happiness forced on him by God Almighty*. So far is God from *prostituting* his *Blessing*, by such a *controlling* of the *will*, and such an *obtruding* of the *object*, as makes the *object unavoidable*, that he doth not only *offer* and *propose* it to his peoples *choice*, but *desires* them also *to choose it*. *I call heaven*

Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus. Nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur. Alioqui ubi necessitas, ibi nec damnatio, nec corona est. Hieron. contra Jovinian. l. 2.

Valet liberum arbitrium ad bona, si divinitus adjuvetur; quod fit, humiliter petendo & faciendo. August. epist. 89. Psal. 119 32.

Joh. 8. 32. Tertull. loco citato. 2 Cor. 5.20. Deut. 30.15, 19.

Josh. 24. 16.

heaven and earth to record this day against you (saith God by *Moses*) *that I have set before you Life and Death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that thou and thy seed may live.* But *choose* we *cannot*, if God works in us *irresistibly*; as I will farther prove by *Reason*.

2. *Proved by Reason.*
Illud propriè dicitur irresistibile, cui resistere nemo potest, quamvis velit. Twiss. in præf. ad vin. Grat. §. 9. p. 31.

46. * That is properly called *irresistible*, which is of such an *over-ruling* and *prevailing force*, that a man *cannot withstand* it, although he *would*. (And thus Dr. *Twisse* hath well *defin'd* it) from whence it followes, that to *choose irresistibly*, is a *contradiction* in *Adjecto*. For it is to *will a thing* whether *one will or no*. He that saith, God *worketh* in us to *choose irresistibly*, doth say in effect, He *so worketh* in us, as that we *cannot choose but choose*. Which is as much as to say, not only *that we do, what we cannot do*, but that we *therefore do it, because we cannot do it*. He that cannot *choose but chose*, doth choose *because* he cannot choose. Which is as bad as to say, that the thing is *necessary, because* it is *impossible*. To make this plain to my *plainest Reader*, I will shew the *legality* of my *deduction* by these degrees. First, he that is *wrought upon* by God (to *believe, obey*, or *persevere*) *irresistibly, cannot possibly* do *otherwise* (then *beleeve, obey*, or *persevere*.) Secondly, he that *cannot possibly* do *otherwise* then he *doth, cannot possibly choose* but *do* what he *doth*. Thirdly, he that *cannot choose* but *do* what he *doth*, doth clearly *do* it *whether he will or no*. Fourthly, he that doth *beleeve, obey*, or *persevere, whether he will or no*, doth do it by as *evident undeniable Necessity*, as *that* by which *a stone tends downwards*. (Which *tendency* of the *stone*, though it is *spontaneous*, yet is not *voluntary*, and as it is not by *violence*, so neither is it by *choice*.) Fifthly, he that *willeth* to *beleeve, obey*, or *persevere, whether he will or no*, doth do

do it by a *Neceſſity*, by which a *ſtone tends upwards*, when it is *thrown*, (Which *tendency* of the *ſtone* is ſo far from *voluntary*, that it is not *ſpontaneous*. It is not only an *irrational*, but an *unnatural* thing.) and beſides implies a *contradiction* in a *voluntary Agent*, which cannot take place in an *involuntary ſtone*. For to ſay, a man *willeth* to *obey* or *beleeve*, *whether he will or no*, is to ſay he *willeth* it either *without* his *will*, or *againſt* his *will*, or elſe *not having a will at all*. Which is as bad as to ſay, that he *muſt needs will it* becauſe he *cannot any way poſſible*. I know not any trick imaginable for the eſcaping the *odium* of theſe *Abſurdities*, unleſſe by denying the *definition* of *irreſiſtible*. Which were not to *eſcape*, but to *commute* abſurdities. And not only the *authority* of Dr. *Twiſſe*, but the very *force* of the *word* would *cry it down*. And ſo little is my *deduction* in a *capacity* to be blam'd, that Doctor *Twiſſe* ſaith expreſly of *irreſiſtibility*, *It hath no place in the act of willing*. And though he pleads for a *Neceſſity*, which he will have to follow Gods *operation* upon the *Soul*, yet he will have that *Neceſſity* to be *no other*, then what may very well *agree* with the *liberty of the will*. So that if that learned *Doctor*, in that his *skirmiſh* with *Arminius*, had not *confounded* a *neceſſity*, with a *certainty* of event, and uſed *that* word in ſtead of *this*, his *Antagoniſt* and *He* (in that particular) muſt needs have *wrangled* into *Friendſhip*. For *Arminius* denieth the *irreſiſtible working* of *Grace* upon the *Will*, and ſo doth Dr. *Twiſſe*. Again Dr. *Twiſſe* affirmeth, that the *liberty of the will* doth agree with the *working* of *Grace* upon the *Will*, and ſo doth *Arminius*. And therefore I hope for no *hard uſage* from ſuch as are *haters* of *Arminius*, whilſt I ſay the *ſame things* with them that *hate him*.

In actu volendi locum non habet. In loco citato.

Ex hujuſmodi autem operatione divinâ exiſtit Neceſſitas effectus, cum ipſâ libertate voluntatis conſentiens. Ibid.

47. Me

The Ground of the oppoſite miſtake removed.

47. Me thinks the *principal Ground* of *my miſtakes heretofore* in this buſineſſe, (if I may be allow'd to paſſe a *conjecture* upon my *ſelf*) is the *miſapprehenſion* of certain Texts, the *cauſe* of whoſe *miſapprehenſion* is the *illogical confounding* of *two things*, which though they *look like one another*, are yet *exceedingly different*. As for *example* from [*Ezek. 26. 27. Cant. 1. 4. 1 Joh. 3. 9. I will cauſe you to walk in my Statutes*, &c. *Draw me, we will run after thee. Whoſoever is born of God cannot ſin, becauſe he is born of God*, and the like] many conclude that *Gods working* upon the *wils* of his *Elect*, is by ſuch a *phyſical immediate immutation* of their *wils*, as doth not only produce a *certain*, but a *neceſſary effect*. And being *forgetful* (rather then *ignorant*) to diſtinguiſh *neceſſity* from *certainty* of *events*, they call that *neceſſary*, which is but *certain*, and *infallible*, and ſo (through *haſt*, or *inadvertency*,) they ſwallow down the Error of *irreſiſtible Grace*; uſing the word *irreſiſtible* in ſtead of *effectual*. And this is a *ſecond Inadvertency* begotten of the *firſt*; as commonly *one error* loves to *draw on another*. Now becauſe a *fallacy* undiſcerned in the *præmiſes* cannot poſſibly be *diſcover'd* by *gazing* only on the *Concluſion*, (juſt as an *error* in the *firſt Concoction*, is hardly mended in the *ſecond*,) I muſt *mark out* the *difference* betwixt *infallible*, and *neceſſary*, Before I can *uſefully diſtinguiſh* betwixt *effectual*, and *irreſiſtible*.

By rightly diſtinguiſhing betwixt infallible and Neceſſary.

48. *Infallible* properly is that, that *cannot erre*, or be *deceived*. That is properly *Neceſſary*, which *cannot but be*. The *firſt* relates to the *perfection* of the *Knowledge* of God, but the *ſecond* to the *Almightineſſe* of his *will*. The *firſt* is properly applyed unto the object of God's *foreſight*, (and though 'tis otherwiſe uſed, yet 'tis by ſuch

ſuch a *Catachreſis*, as I humbly conceive to be a *ſtone of ſtumbling*,) But the *ſecond* more *preciſely* unto the object of his *Decree*. The *firſt* is *conſiſtent* with thoſe *contingent events*, to which the *ſecond* is *Diametrically oppoſed*. As for example. That I am *now writing*, is but *contingent*, becauſe I do it upon *choiſe*. Yet Gods *foreknowledge* of this my writing from all *Eternity* did infer that this my writing would *infallibly come to paſſe*. This *event* is *contingent*, for I can *chooſe*; but yet *infallible*, for God cannot *erre*. This *contingent* therefore doth *infallibly* come to paſſe, not by way of a *conſequent*, but by way of *conſequence*. My *writing* being not the *effect*, but the *object* only of God's *Omniſcience*. Which is, in *point* of order, *before* the *Act*. God *foreſees* a *contingent* will *contingently* come to paſſe, and therefore we infer it will *infallibly* come to paſſe, becauſe *he foreſees* it who is *infallible*. So that his *præſcience* is a *Conſequent* of the thing's coming to paſſe; and it's *infallibility* of coming to paſſe, is *inferr'd* from his *præſcience*, only by way of *Conſequence*. It is one thing, *to follow* as the *effect* of a *Cauſe*, in order of *Nature*; and quite another, to *follow* as the *ſequel* of an *Antecedent*, in way of *Argumentation*. The *ſhort* and *plain* upſhot of all is this. The precious *veſſels* of *Election* do very *certainly* and *infallibly* perſevere unto the end, and that by reaſon of God's *omniſcience* which cannot be *deceived*; but not of *neceſſity* and *irreſiſtibly*, by reaſon of his *omnipotence* which cannot be *fruſtrated* or *defeated*. What God *foreſees* ſhall come to paſſe, *ſhall infallibly* come to paſſe, and that becauſe he cannot *erre*, who is *omniſcient*. (On the other ſide) what God *decrees* ſhall come to paſſe, *muſt* come to paſſe of *neceſſity*, becauſe he cannot be *reſiſted*, who is *omnipotent*.

Betwixt ſufficient, effectuall, and unreſiſtible.

49. Hence it is eaſie to *diſtinguiſh* betwixt the *other two or three things*, which have ſo *often*, and ſo *unhappily been confounded*; I mean *ſufficient*, *effectual*, and *irreſiſtible*, applyed to *Grace*. 1 *Sufficien. Grace* is that, which *poſſibly may* produce that *effect* for which it is given. 2 *Effectual* is that, which *certainly will*. 3 *Irreſiſtible* is that, which *neceſſarily muſt*. That which is *irreſiſtible* doth *carry away* its *object* to what it pleaſeth, like a mighty *Torrent*, by *indiſputable force*, maugre the *greateſt oppoſition* that can be made, and therefore cannot take place in the *elections* of the *will*, which ceaſeth to *elect* after the nature of a *will*, if it be made to do any thing *whether it will or no*. (as hath already been *ſhew'd* from no leſſe a *conceſſion* then that of Doctor *Twiſſe*.) But that which is *effectual only*, is quite another thing, and doth *prevail* upon the *will* not *ineluctably*, but *infallibly*. It doth ſo *ſtrongly* and *effectually incline* the *will*, at ſuch *critical opportunities*, and by ſuch *congruous means*. as that the *will* doth very *certainly* and *undoubtedly aſſent*. But it doth not ſo *irreſiſtibly* and *compulſively neceſſitate*, as to take away the *freedom* and *poſſibility* of *aſſenting*, by making it do what it doth, even *whether it will or no*.

Betwixt action in general, and volition in particular. Betwixt Taking and Chooſing.

50. I *diſcern* the *Truth* of this *diſtinction* with greater *eaſe*, by having alwaies in my *proſpect* the very great difference, betwixt the *generical* notion of *acting*, or *taking*, and the *ſpecifical* notion of *willing*, or *chooſing*. God indeed (if it pleaſe him) can by his *abſolute power* over his *Creature*, make him *act* this thing, or *take* that thing, by *ineluctable Neceſſity*, and *whether he will or no*. But then that *acting* is not *volition*, and that *taking* is not *choiſe*. For the very word *choiſe* cannot be rightly *apprehended*, but it muſt carry along with it a *ſound* of *freedom*. *Optio* muſt be

be *optimorum*, and so *duorum* at the least. It is of *two things* or *more*, that we *choose* the *best*, whether in *reality*, or in *appearance*. And this *liberty* of the *will*, by which we *choose*, being acknowledg'd on all sides, (as well by Mr. *Perkins*, and Dr. *Twisse*, as by *Bellarmine*, and *Arminius*, as every man knows who hath but *read* and *compar'd* them) that famous Nova of a *twofold Necessity*, the one of *coaction*, and the other of *infallibility*, (being built upon a *manifest* and *grosse mistake* both of the word *Necessity*, and the word *Infallibility*,) seems to me to be serviceable to no other end, then to *cover* a *wound*, which 'tis impossible to *cure*. But admit of that *distinction* of a *twofold Necessity*, or admit a *Necessity* be *twentifold*, yet still it ceaseth not to have the nature of a *Necessity*. If it is *absolutely Necessary* that I *must* go to *London*, it doth not cease to be *Necessity*, because I am *drawn*, rather then *driven*. *Coaction*, and *infallibility*, if they both imply an *absolute* and *peremptory Necessity*, (and so by consequence an *irresistibility*, and so by consequence are *opposed* to the *elective* faculty of the *Will*,) it is no matter how they differ in their *syllables* and their *sounds*. Shall I declare my *Judgement* then, (although in *weakness*, yet in *sincerity*) how *freewill* is *necessary* to the *choosing* of *good*, to which, *without Grace*, it is *altogether insufficient*? My judgement is, that it is *necessary*, not as a *Cause*, but as a *Condition*. Not as that, *by vertue of which*, we can *do* any thing that is *good*; but as that, *without which*, we cannot *choose* it. God's *Grace* alone is the *cause* of the *good*, but *man's will* is as really the *instrument* of the *choise*. We can *do* good, as God's *Engines*, *without a will*; and so did *Balaams Asse*, without a *Reason*. But we cannot *choose* good, without a *freewill*, as that

Aſſe could not poſſibly *underſtand* what ſhe *ſpake*, *without* a *Ratiocination*. This ſeems to me to be as *plain* as the *light*. And now I ſpeak of the *light*, (if my *Reader* pleaſe) by that *light* I will make it *plain*. We know the Sun is the *fountain* or *Cauſe* of *light*. And *light* the only *means* by which we *ſee*. But yet the *opening* of the *Eye-lid* is a *neceſſary condition*, becauſe if I *wink*, I am *dark* at *noon*. And if my *Eyelid* is *held open* by ſuch a *power* as I cannot *reſiſt*, my *Eye* in that caſe cannot *chooſe but ſee*, and therefore cannot *chooſe to ſee*. My ſight may be with *delectation*, but not properly with that which is call'd *election*. Thus if any man be *delighted* in doing good, but (by reaſon of *Neceſſity*) cannot poſſibly *but do it*, it is God that *chooſeth* that good, and the man doth only *act* it. I ſay *God chooſeth*, by a *catachreſtical* way of ſpeaking, meerly the better to *ſhew* my *thoughts*. For though God did *chooſe* to *make a world*, and *one* world, becauſe it was in his power to have made *many worlds*, or *none at all*; yet I conceive it *abſurd*, to ſay that God did *chooſe* to be *good*, or that he *chooſeth* to *do good*, (in oppoſition to *evil*) becauſe he *is good*, and *doth good*, by an *abſolute neceſſity*; he cannot *chooſe to be*, or *to do*, any *otherwiſe*. And ſo he *loves*, but does not *chooſe it*. For if that were *true ſpeaking*, 'twould be as *true ſpeaking* to ſay, that God doth *will* his *being* and *doing good*, *whether he will or no*; or that he *cannot chooſe but chooſe*. Which is ſure very *childiſh untoward ſpeaking*. Only he *chooſeth* to *enable us* to *do* it, becauſe he can *chooſe*, whether he *will* ſo *enable* us, or *no*. When he *giveth* us his *Grace*, he hath the *power* to *withhold* it; when he *continueth* his *Grace*, he hath the *power* to *withdraw* it; therefore doth he *chooſe* both to *give* and to *continue* it. The *goodneſſe* of his *eſſence* is not

arbitrary

arbitrary and *elective*, but *ſpontaneous* and *natural*. Whereas the *goodneſſe* of his *effects* in all his *Creatures*, is not *naturally neceſſary* in reſpect of him, but *arbitrary* and *elective*, meerly depending upon his *pleaſure*. For he *gave* us our *goodneſſe when we would*, and may *take it away* when he *pleaſeth*. To *underſtand* this the *better*, and to *hold* it *faſt* in my *underſtanding*,

Betwixt *voluntary* and *ſpontaneous*.

51. I muſt carefully *diſtinguiſh*, betwixt *ſpontaneum*, (that which is *of its own accord*) and *voluntarium*, (that which is *freely* and upon *choiſe*.) The *firſt* is *agreeable* to *inanimate* creatures, the *ſecond* only to *rational*. *That* is properly *oppos'd* to *violence*, but *reconcilable* with *neceſſity*, to which *this* is *oppos'd*. As for example. A ſtone *tends downwards* by a *natural*, and *neceſſary*, and *ſpontaneous* motion. It tends downwards of *neceſſity*, becauſe it *cannot but do* ſo. And yet *ſpontaneouſly*, becauſe it doth it *without violence*, and *of its own accord*. But yet that motion is not *voluntary*, nor doth the *ſtone chooſe* that kind of *tendency*, becauſe it could not *refuſe* it, as not being furniſht with the *liberty* of a *will*. Thus when I made my entrance out of the *womb* into the *world*, I did not *chooſe* to go *forwards*, becauſe I had *not* the *power* to ſtay *behind*. I did it as a *ſpontaneous*, not as a *voluntary* Agent. But now that I am capable either of *virtue*, or of *vice*, and do *purſue* the *one*, in *refuſal* of the *other*, I do it not only in a *ſpontaneous*, but in a *voluntary* manner. We have the *perfect character* of a *voluntary Agent* in that admirable παράγραφον of the *Son of Syrach*, *The Lord left man in the hand of his Counſel; if thou wilt, to keep the Commandments. He hath ſet fire and water before thee; ſtretch forth thy hand unto whether thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh ſhall be given him* I dare not

Eccleſiaſticus 15, 13, 14.15.16.17.

not (like *Marcion*) be more inquiſitive, why God made man with ſuch a freedom of *willing* or *nilling*, then why he made the hand with thoſe *two Muſcles*, whereof the *one* doth move *to the taking* of a thing, and the *other*, to the *throwing of it away*.

A reſult of the whole in two Examples.

52. Having ſpoken all this in order to the clearing of *reſiſtibility* in the *working* of *Grace* in God's *Elect*, I think I cannot do better, then to *apply* my preſent reaſoning to *two examples*, (at leaſt as much of it as ſhall be needfull) whereof one muſt be the *Protoplaſt*, *before* his *Fall*, and the other muſt be one of his *poſterity*, whom we are very well aſſur'd to have been one of God's *Elect*. *Adam* was made in a ſtate of *Innocence*, and (God not requiring any *Impoſſibilities*, as *brick* without *ſtraw*,) had grace enough to have perform'd a moſt *adæquate obedience* to Gods *Command*. Which if he had *not reſiſted*, how could he poſſibly have *ſin'd*? and if that *meaſure* of *Grace* was leſſen'd, before he *ſin'd*, how was the *taking away* of *Grace* any *puniſhment* of his *Fall*? or how was he then in the *ſtate* of *Innocence*? If he was not, then was he *ſinful*, *before* he *ſin'd*. God does not *take away* his *Grace*, unleſſe to *puniſh* the *abuſe* of it. But *Adam* did not *abuſe* it, before he *ſin'd*; and by our *Saviour's* Rule [*To him that hath ſhall be given*) God would rather have given him *more*, then have taken away *any*. From whence it followes, that though the *working* of *Grace* in the *heart* of *Adam*, was ſo *ſtrong*, and ſo *perfect*, as to *enable* him to *ſtand*, and that in no leſſe then a ſtate of *Innocence*, yet was it alſo ſo *reſiſtible*, as to ſuffer him to *fall*, and that into no leſſe then a ſtate of *Perdition*. And although he had the favour to be *rais'd* again in *ſome meaſure*, yet it was not to that *Innocence* from whence he *fell*. So that

Mat. 25. 28.

as

as to his *firſt Covenant*, and his firſt *pitch* of *perfection*, his *Fall* was not only *total*, but *final* too. And indeed I would know, why our *Saviour* hath told us, that *from him that hath not, ſhall be taken away even that which he hath*, if it is not for this reaſon, *becauſe he hath laviſht out his talent*, and hath *reſiſted* that *power* of doing well which was *offer'd* him. There is no better arguing, then *ab actu ad potentiam*. Man *can reſiſt*, becauſe he *doth*. And I may wonder, as well as *Grotius*, why ſuch men are not *confuted* by their own manifold *experience*, who ſay that *Grace* in the *Elect* is *unreſiſtible*, unleſſe they will deny Themſelves to be of the *number* of the *Elect*. *David* had *Grace* to have done *better* then he did, in the *double* matter of *Vriah*; but he *reſiſted* it with a *witneſſe*, and that for *ſome months together*. He was a *veſſel* of *election*; how then did he *reſiſt* the *Grace* of God, ſo as to *fall* into thoſe *damnable* and *killing ſins*, in which, if he had *dyed*, he had *periſh'd irreverſibly*? it was not *without Grace*, (for he was one of the *Elect*,) nor by its *concurrence*, (for God was not *guilty*,) it was therefore *againſt* the *working* and *means* of *Grace*. Indeed if God did his *utmoſt*, ſuch as *David* could *never ſin*. Or if they could, it would argue *God conquer'd*, by *man*, or *Devil*. Unleſſe we ſhould ſay, that ſuch *omnipotent Grace* doth *come*, and *go*, and *come* again, after the meaſure that God is willing, a man ſhould *ſin*, and *repent*, and *ſin again*. And therefore it is evident, that God Almighty, in his *Elect*, doth ſhew only the *congruous and the efficacious Power*; not the *irreſiſtibility*, and *Almightineſſe* of his *Grace*. Sure *David* (and *Solomon*) did *fall* from *Grace*, by *reſiſting it*, in both acceptions of the word *Grace*; as it is taken for *gracious* living, and as it is taken for the *favour of God*,)

God,) and this is *invincibly concluſible* even from that very *anſwer*, which is wont to be *alledged* for *irreſiſtibility*. For they ſay, God had *decreed* the *Repentance* and *new life* of *David*, and therefore he could *not die*, till he had *repented*. Which is ſpoken by them for *this reaſon*, becauſe if *David* had *not repented*, he muſt have *periſht*. Which yet he could not have don, if he had really *continued* in the *ſtate* of *Grace*.

And that cleared from an exception.

53. If againſt this it is excepted, That though a *veſſel of Election* may *fall damnably from Grace*, yet he cannot *finally*, this is unworthy for a *Scholar*, to *ſpeak*, or *hear*; for who ever was *ſo ſilly*, as to *ſay*, or *think*, that the precious *veſſels* of *Election* can *fall* away *finally*? this is not *anſwering* the *argument*, but *forſaking* the *Queſtion*. The *Queſtion* is, whether the *Grace* of God doth work *irreſiſtibly* in the *Elect*? not, whether or no it *brings them* to a moſt *certain* and *infallible* degree of *bliſſe*. (For they that *diſpute* againſt the *firſt*, *affirm* the *ſecond*,) *Grace* is proved to be *reſiſtible* in Gods *Elect*, by ſuch examples as *David*. And to that it is anſwer'd, he could not *ſo reſiſt*, as to fall away *finally*. Which is (firſt) a *skipping* from the *firſt* Queſtion, to the *ſecond*; and (*ſecondly*) 'tis to ſay, (what no man living did ever *gainſay*) That *ſuch as perſevere unto the end can never fall away finally*. A groſſe *identical propoſition*, which does not only *betray* the *weakneſſe* of that *opinion* which it *aſſerteth*, but does *eſtabliſh* the *Truth* of this very *cauſe* which I am *pleading*. For it confeſſeth, that *Grace* is *reſiſtible*; and only denies, that it is *finally reſiſted*. *David* was *able* to *reſiſt* it, but he *did* not *reſiſt* it *unto the end*. And every *technical Grammarian* can diſtinguiſh the *Act* which is imply'd in the *Participle*, from the *Aptitude* which is couched in the *Adjective* in *bilis*.

lis. But (to haſten towards the end of my Readers *Task*,) there is alſo a *final*, as well as *total reſiſting* of ſuch a *Grace*, as is *ſufficient* for the attainment of *Glory*. For (not to ſpeak of thoſe men who *reſiſted* and *ſinn'd* againſt *all means* which could be us'd, *Iſa.* 5.4. and who *alwaies reſiſted the holy Ghoſt*, *Act.* 7. 51. and who *would not be gathered*; *after* never ſo *many eſſays*, *Mat.* 23.37.) how many *Chriſtian profeſſors* are now in *Hell*, who when they were *Infants*, were *fit* and *ſuitable* for *Heaven*? *Shall not I ſpare* Nineveh, *in which are above* 120000 *ſouls, which cannot diſtinguiſh betwixt the right hand and the left*? *Jon.* 4. 11. God ſpeaks there of *Heathen Infants*, towards whom ('tis ſaid) his *Bowels* did *yearn* within him, and that upon the *Impendence* of but a *temporal deſtruction*. But I ſpeak *here* of *Infants*, *both born*, and *baptiz'd*, into a *membership* of the Church. How many are there of ſuch, as in their *harmleſſe Nonage* were *babes* of *Grace*, and yet have *out liv'd* their *Innocence*, ſo as at laſt to be transform'd into *veſſels* of *wrath*? I will ſhut up this *Paragraph* with the words of *Tertullian*. *Saul was turned into a Prophet by the Spirit of of holineſſe, as well as into an Apoſtate by the ſpirit of uncleanneſſe. And the Devil entred into* Judas, *who for ſome time together had been deputed with the elect.* And with the ſaying of *S. Auguſtine*, That *if the regenerate and juſtified ſhall fall away into a wicked courſe of living by his own will and pleaſure, he cannot ſay, I have not received, becauſe he hath wilfully loſt that Grace of God which he had received, by that will of his which was at liberty to ſin.* And how exactly that *Father doth ſpeak* my ſenſe

Jonah. 4.11.

Saulem tam Dei Spiritus vertit in Prophetam, quam & malus ſpiritus poſtea in Apoſtatam. Judam aliquandiu cum electis deputatum poſtea Diabolus intravit. Tertul. de Animâ. c. 1.

Si regeneratus & juſtificatus in malam vitam ſuâ voluntate relabitur, certò is non poteſt dicere, Non accepi, quia acceptam gratiam Dei ſuo in malum arbitrio libero amiſit. Aug. de Grat. & Correp. c. 6. &. c. 9.

* De præd. Sanct. l. 1. c. 14. De bono Perſev. l. 2. c. 1. & 6. & l. 2. c. 8. & 13.

ſenſe of this buſineſſe, I leave it for any one to judge who ſhall conſult * him. And I would very fain know, whether the *loſt Groat*, the *loſt Sheep*, and the *prodigal Son*, do not ſignifie (in our *Saviours Parables*) that a *true beleever* may be *loſt*, and being *loſt* may be *found*, and again become a *true beleever*. Which is as much as I deſire, whereby to prove the thing under conſideration.

CHAP. V.

The Decree of Election conditional and reſpective.

54. HAving evinced to my ſelf (and that is all that I pretend to) Firſt, that my will *of it ſelf* is *inclinable* to *evil*; and that, ſecondly, *of it ſelf* is *not inclinable* to *good*; and that, thirdly, it is *inclined* by the *ſingular* and *ſpecial operation* of *Grace*, to the *refuſing* of *evil*, and to the *chooſing* of *good*, and that therefore in the *fourth place*, that *ſingular Grace* doth not *work* ſo *irreſiſtibly* as to *compel* an *unwilling will*, but yet ſo *ſtrongly* as to *heal* a *ſick* one; not ſo *neceſſitating* the *will* of God's elect, as that *inevitably* it *muſt*, but yet ſo *powerfully perſwading*, as that it *certainly will*, both *believe* and *obey*, and (after *repentance*) *perſevere* unto the *end*; I ſhould in *civility* to my *Reader*, conclude his *Trouble*; If I were ſure that ſome men would not call it *Tergiverſation*,; and if I were not *obliged* by *thoſe papers*, which have been ſo *frequently*, ſo *falſly*, (that I may not ſay ſo maliciouſly) tranſcribed, and are *threatned* to be laid very *publiquely* to my *charge*, (as I plead often in the *defence* of this mine own *Publication*, which I ſhould

Quâ gratiâ non nova voluntas creatur, neq; invita voluntas cogitur, ſed infirma ſanatur, depravata corrigitur, & ex malâ in bonam convertitur, ac interiore quodam modo trahitur, ut ex nolente volens efficiatur, & Divinæ vocationi libenter conſentiat, &c. Auguſt. de grat. & lib. arb. ad Valent. c. 13.

I should never have *chosen* on *such* a *subject*, as I have *least* of all *studied*, and am the least *delighted* in,) to remonstrate the *utmost* of what I think in these matter. For I do *stedfastly beleeve* (what I also *asserted* in that *extemporary Discourse*, which was the *innocent cause* of this *unacceptable effect*,) That Gods *Decree* of *Election* from all *eternity*, was not *absolute*, and *irrespective*, but in *respect unto*, and in *præscience* of some qualification, without which *no man is the proper object* of *such Decree*. And this I prove to my self from these waies of Reasoning.

Sicut præscit, prædestinat, & propterea prædestinat, quia quale futurum sit, præscit. Mala tantùm præscit, & non prædestinat. Aug. in Resp. ad calum. Pelag. sub initium l. 6. Hypognosticon.

Proved by reason, from its being respective of our being in Christ, and of the conditions by which we are so.

55. *First*, I consider with my self, that there is *no salvation* but only to *such*, as are found to be in *Christ Jesus*, in the day of *Death* and of *Judgement*. Which no man living can be, unless he be qualified with such *conditions*, as *without which* it is *impossible* to be *so found*; (such as are *Faith*, and *Obedience*, and *Repentance*, after sin, *bringing forth such fruits as are worthy of Repentance*, and *perseverance* in *weldoing unto the end*.) That God will *save* none but *such*, is *all intelligent men's Confession*. And that he *saves* none but *Them* whom he *decrees* to save, is every whit as *plain*. Therefore none but *such* are the *object* of *such Decree*. For if he *decreed* to save any without *regard* or *respect* to their being such, he might *actually save* them without *regard* or *respect* to their being *such*. Because whatsoever is *justly decreed*, may justly be *executed*, as it is decreed. But it is granted on all sides, (as I suppose,) that God will save *none*, except *such* as are found to be in *Christ* with the aforesaid *qualifications*; and therefore it should be *agreed* on all sides, that he *decreed* to save *none* but *such as They*. And what is that but a *respective*, and *conditional* Decree? made in *intuition* of our *being* in *Christ*, and of our being

so qualified to be *in Christ*? So that although *our election is not of works*, but *of him that calleth*, yet *good works* are required as a *necessary condition*, though utterly unworthy to be a *cause* of *our election*. Nor can it be without respect to the *condition* of the *Covenant*, that the *Covenant* is *made*, and the *promise decreed* to be *fulfilled*.

56. *Secondly*, I consider, that the *Decree* of the *Father* to *send* the *Son* to be a *second Adam*, was in *respect* and *regard* to the *backesliding* of the *first Adam*. Without which it was *impossible*, that the Son of God should have been sent to be the *Saviour* of the world. And the *decree* of God Almighty to save the *first Adam*, was in regard of and *respect* to the *meritoriousnesse* of the *second Adam*. For God *adopteth* never a *child*, nor doth *acknowledge* him for *his own*, so as to give him *eternal life*, unlesse it be for the sake of his *only begotten Son*. First God *pitied* a *woful world*, then he *lov'd* what he *pitied*, next he *gave* his own *Son* to *save* what he *lov'd*, and upon the *condition* of *beleeving in his Son*, he gave it a promise of *eternal life*. For so *beleeving* is *interpos'd* betwixt *love* and *life*, in the 3. of *S. John* vers. 26. *God so lov'd the world*, that he gave his only *begotten Son*, that whosoever *beleeveth in him*, should not perish, but have *everlasting life*. From this Text it appeareth, that God *loved* the *world*, *before* he *gave* his *Son* to it; for *therefore gave* he his *Son*, because he *lov'd* it. But it was not a *love* by which he lov'd it to *life everlasting*; for with *such love* he only loved it in his *Son*. And the world is not capable of such a *love*, without the *condition* of *Beleeving*. It was therefore in præscience of our *Beleeving in Christ*, that God *elected* us to *life eternal*. For Christ is not *only* the *means*, (as some affirm) but the *meritorious cause*, and the *Head* of our

Eph. 1. 4. 6.
Rom. 8. 39.
2 Cor. 5. 15.

our *Election*. *Chriſt was foreknown*, 1 *Pet.* 1. 2. and *we in him*, *Rom.* 8. 29. Chriſt was *prædeſtin'd*, and *we by him*, *Eph.* 1. 5.

57. *Thirdly*, I conſider, that there muſt be a *Difference*, before there can be an *Election*. *Love* indeed is an *act* of *favour*, but *Election* is properly an *act* of *Judgement*; a *preferring* of the *better*, before the *worſe*. They that ſay God *Elected* ſuch a number of men, without the leaſt *intuition* of their qualifications, by which they are differenced from the *reprobated crew*, do ſpeak *illogically* (to ſay no worſe,) how much *ſafer* is it to ſay, That becauſe ſuch men as are *in Chriſt by Faith*, are *better* then ſuch as are *out of Chriſt* by *Infidelity*, therefore *Thoſe* are *taken*, and *Theſe* are *left*? Nor doth this *derogate* from *God*, or *arrogate* to *man*, to ſay he *chooſeth* his own *gifts*; any more then it doth, to ſay *he crown's them*. For God doth *give* us the *advantage* of our being *in Chriſt*, as well as *chooſe* us for that *advantage*. For firſt he *giveth* us his *Son*, next he giveth us his *Grace* whereby to *enable* us to *believe* in his *Son*, and *ſo beleeving* he doth *elect* us. So that here is no *matter* for man to *boaſt of*; he having *nothing* which he hath not *received*, no not ſo much as his ἀντιξύσιον. It is *God* that *makes* the *difference*, as well as *God* that *chooſeth*. And it ſeems this very argument from the *Nature* and *Vſe* of the word *Election*, did prevail with *S. Auſtin* and *Oecumenius*. *S. Auſtin* ſaith expreſly, that *Juſtification precedeth Election*; and his reaſon is, becauſe no man is *elected*, *unleſſe he differ from him that is rejected*.

And from the nature of Election.

Εἰπὼν κατ' ἐκλογὴν, ἔδειξεν ὅτι ἐξ ὑπάρξεως ἀλλάλων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκλέγεται ἕτερον ἀπ' ἐτέρου, εἰ μή τι αὐτῷ διαλλάττοι. *Oecum. apud Epiſc. Wint. de Artic. Lam. Jud.*

Non tamen Electio præcedit Juſtificationem, ſed Electionem Juſtificatio. Nemo enim eligitur, niſi jam diſtans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum eſt, Quia elegit nos Deus ante mundi conſtitutionem, non video quomodo ſit dicendum niſi præſcientiâ. Auguſt. ad Simpl. 1. 2.

58. *Fourthly*,

Proved by Scripture.

58. *Fourthly*, I consider, that the whole *Tenor* of the *Scriptures*, in the *Judgement* of *all* the *Fathers*, who are best able to *understand them*, teacheth no other *Prædestination*, then *in*, and *through Christ*, which is *respective* and *conditional*. First the Scripture gives us none but *conditional promises*, such as, *If any man keep my saying, he shall never taste Death. Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap.* And *we shall reap, if we faint not. If any man will hear my voice, and open the dore, I will come in to him*, &c. Nay even the very Texts which are wont to be urged for *irrespective Election*, do seem very precisely to *evince* the *contrary*. For when God is said to *prædestine* according to *his own good pleasure which he had purposed in himself*, the word εὐδοκία rendred *good pleasure*, doth not signifie the *absoluteness*, but the *respectiveness* of his *will*. For it *relateth* unto something in which God is *well pleased*, and that is *Christ*. It being impossible for God to *please himself* with *mankind*, or for *men* to be *acceptable* and *well-pleasing* to God, any otherwise then in *him*, of whom it was said, *This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased*. Besides; *all* those *Scriptures* which doe teach *universal Grace*, and *Redemption*, (which I suppose hath been *proved* in the prosecution of my *first Principle*,) do seem to me most clearly to inferre a *respective* and *conditional Election*. For if it is true, that Christ did offer up himself, not only *sufficiently*, but *intentionally* for all; if he did *earnestly desire* that *every one* would *come in*, upon the preaching of his *Word*, and receive the benefit of his *Death* and *Passion*; if his *warnings* were not in *jest*, and his *Invitations serious*; if [*depart from me ye cursed*] was therefore *foretold*, that every one might *beware*, and not *obtrude* himself

Joh. 8. 51. Gal. 6. 7. 9. Rev. 3. 20.

Eph. 9.

himself upon that *sentence*; if he is *unwilling* that any one should be *caught* in the *Serpents snare*, who shewes to *all* (without exception) a *certain way* to *escape*, if (as S. *Austin speaks*) *he* is desirous *not* to *strike*, who bids us *look* to our *posture*, and *stand* upon our *Guard*; if (as S. *Austin* speaks *again*) he shews his *power* to to *punish none*, but only those that *refuse* his *Mercy*; and would not *damn* any one without *respect* unto *sin*, who gave his *own Son* to die for *All*; then his refusing of the *Goats*, in *respect* of that which makes them *differ* from *Sheep*, infers his *Election* of the *sheep*, in *respect* of that which makes them differ from *Goats*. And I have made the more haste to make *this Inference*, because as the *respectiveness* of *Election* needs not otherwise to be prov'd, than by the *respectiveness* of *Reprobation*; so they are both taken for *granted*, upon the supposition of *Christ*'s having dyed not only *sufficiently*, but *intentionally* for *All*. Towards which (having discoursed so largely of it already I will only offer this *one consideration*, which *meets* my *pen* as I am *writing*, and even *obtrudes* it self upon me to be *deliver'd*. 'Tis briefly this. That since our *Saviour* upon the *Crosse*, did very *heartily pray*, even for those very *homicides*, and *parricides*, and *Deicides* that *Kill'd* him, we have no reason but to believe, That he *laid down* his *life* even for *them* that *took it away*; and that he *dyed* for *all* for whom he *prayed*. And yet we reading of their *Murders*, but not of their *Repentance*, I should be loth to tell *my people*, that those *crucifying wretches*, were *pretious vessels* of *Election*, (in complyance with that opinion, that *Christ died only for the Elect*,) lest they should *comfort* up themselves in the most *crimson sins* that

Aug. in Serm. 28. de Sanct. Idem contra 2 epist. Pelag. l. 3. c. 2. Idem de sp. & lit. ad Marcell. c. 33.

that can be nam'd, (like some in the world,) as *well consisting* with their *pretensions* to the *Kingdom* of *Heaven*. And yet in my *shallow* Judgement, (which because it is *shallow*, I do submit to those of *deeper* & *profounder reach*, how *dogmatically* soever I may seem to have spoken in many places of this Discourse,) I say in my shallow Judgement, Christ dyed for *All*, for whom he *pray'd*; and he *prayed* for them that *curst themselves*. *His bloud be upon us* (said they,) and yet (said he,) *Father forgive them*. He made his *Murderers Execration* become his *prayer*. He took the *poyson* out of their *Curse*, & made it *wholesome* for them. He *wished*, as well as they, *that his bloud might be, both upon them, and upon their children*; but in his own most *merciful*, not in their barbarous and *cruel sense*; for *they* meant the *guilt*, *He* the *benefit* of his *bloud*; and would have it *light on them*, not to *accuse*, but *cleanse* them. And yet I dare not affirm, that they were all a *portion* of *God's Elect*.

59. Lastly, I consider, that the main *stream* of the *Fathers* doth *run* this *way*. And not to trouble my *Reader* with such a *Catalogue* of particulars, as I gave in before, for a *Conditional* Reprobation, (which yet I think were very easie upon a very *smal warning*,) I will content my self at present to prove what I say from the confessions of *Beza*, & Doctor *Twisse*. First *Beza* in his *Comment* upon Rom. 11. 2. rejects the Judgement of the *Fathers*, because they are not (as he would have them) for the *absolute*, *irrespective*, *unconditonal* way. And Dr. *Twisse* confesseth, that *all the Ancients*, before *S. Austin*, did place the *object* of *God's Election* in *Fide praevisâ*. At which *S. Austin* was so far from being any way displeas'd, as that (with very great *reverence* to their *Authority*) he made it appear to be an *innocent* and *harmlesse Tenent*. He affirm'd that all the *Fathers*, who liv'd before

And by Antiquity, from the concessions of Anti-remonstrants. Patres hîc nullo modo audiendi, qui ad praevisionem hoc referunt. Beza *in* Rom. 11. 2. edit. 2. *Twiss. in Vin. Gr. l. 1. part. 1. Digr. 8. sect. 4. p. 110. August de bono persever. c. 19. & 20. Twiss. loco citato.*

before himſelf, agreed in this, *That the Grace of God is not prevented by humane merits.* Which *one profeſſion* he thought *ſufficient, for the aſſerting of the free Grace of the Divine prædeſtination.* To which ſaying of S. *Auſtin* becauſe I find that Dr. *Twiſſe* doth very *readily ſubſcribe*; I ought in reaſon to be ſecured from any very *hard cenſure*, becauſe I am not an *affirmer* of *humane merits*, much leſſe do I *place* them in a *precedency* to *Grace.*

The Concluſion.

60. I conclude with a deſire of ſo much *liberty* of *conſcience*, as to believe with S. *Paul*, That *God is a reſpecter, not of* * *Perſons*, but of * *Works.* That my *ſins* are *perfectly* and *entirely mine own.* And that if I do any thing that is *good*, it is *not I that do it*, but the *Grace* of *God* in me. Yet ſo, as that *I can* do *all things*, through him that *ſtrengthens me.* And who indeed doth *ſo ſtrengthen*, as that I *may* do them, but not ſo *force* me, as that I *muſt.* In this, and every other thing, I have been long ſince taught by *Vincentius Lirinenſis*, (whom I ſhall ever obſerve to the *utmoſt* of my *Diſcretion*) To *opine* with the *moſt*, and *moſt Judicious*, rather then with the *feweſt*, and leaſt *diſcerning.* *Opinionaſtrete* is a *fault*; but *Fallibility* is *none.* If my *Teachers* are in the *right*, they have *knowledge* enough, to make me *moderately inſtructed*; if they are any where in the *wrong*, they have *authority* enough, to make me *pardonably erroneous*; if I have not *perſpicacity* to *comprehend* them as they deſerve, it ſeems they have *Depths* enough to prove, I am *Invincibly ignorant.*

* Rom. 2. 11.
* Verſ. 14.
1 Cor. 15. 10.
Phil. 4, 13.

FINIS.